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THE FIGHTER INTERCEPTOR FORCE 1962 - 1964

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FOREWORD

It was a time of alarms and excursions and steady attrition of the fighter force, the period from 1962 to 1964. In 1962 there was rapid deployment and dispersal to meet the threat posed by Cuba. In 1963, the possibility of an increased threat to Alaska made it necessary to shift ADC interceptors to that area. In 1964, ADC began providing a "portable" air defense for the Panama Canal Zone. Meanwhile, despite the addition of a few F-104A aircraft to the tactical inventory, attrition ate away nearly 15 per cent of the available force during the 30-month period between January 1962 and June 1964. There were 805 interceptors in the ADC inventory at the end of 1961. By the middle of 1964 that number had shrunk to 688. And attrition was likely to continue, since production of interceptors had ceased in 1961. There was the possibility, however, that the form of Improved Manned Interceptor (IMI) represented by the YF-12A (Air Force designation for the A-11) would ultimately be made available for air defense use. The model unveiled to the public 30 September 1964 included the ASG-18 fire control system and the AIM-47A air-to-air missile, the subsystems essential in converting an advanced fighter into an advanced interceptor. The decision to authorize quantity production of the YF-12A had not yet been made.

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CHAPTER ONE

THE CUBAN CRISIS AND THE AFTERMATH

Reaction within the United States was generally favorable in late 1958 when the rebels of Fidel Castro came down out of the Cuban mountains and when, in January 1959, they ousted the current dictator, Fulgencio Batista. Events of the next two years, however, offered adequate proof that Castro's Cuba was no friend of the United States. There was increasing evidence that Cuba, despite its location, had been drawn behind the Iron Curtain. On 3 January 1961 the Eisenhower administration, as one of its last official acts, broke diplomatic relations with Cuba.

The emergence of a Communist state off the Florida coast, plus intelligence concerning the lengthening of

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airport runways and the building of missile pads, made it prudent to look to the defenses of south Florida. There was no likelihood of a major offensive strike from Cuba, but Castro was believed capable of nuisance raids against Miami, where many of his opponents had taken refuge, and other cities of south Florida. CONAD (the U.S. element of NORAD) decided to take out insurance for south Florida in the form of a "Contingency Plan for Augmenting the Air Defenses of Southern Florida," dated 5 January 1961. This plan called for the Navy to deploy interceptors to Key West, with ADC supplying the contingent at Homestead AFB, south of Miami. The CONAD document, which came to be known as the "Southern Tip" plan, was not immediately effective, however, because JCS approval was required prior to implementation.[1]

Oddly enough, the only permanently based Air Force interceptor strength in the area, the 76th FIS at McCoy AFB, Pinecastle, Florida, was in the process of moving to the northeast at the time the requirement for strengthening the defenses of Florida developed. In order to position the

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1. [redacted], CONAD Operation Plan 1-61, "Contingency Plan for Augmenting the Air Defenses of Southern Florida," 5 Jan 1961 [Doc 96 in Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1961].

diminishing interceptor force as nearly astride probable enemy approach routes as possible, USAF, in the summer of 1960, had approved the transfer of the 76th FIS from McCoy to Westover AFB in Massachusetts. The 76th had disposed of most of its F-89J aircraft by the end of 1960 and aircrews and support personnel had begun to move north. F-102A interceptors for the re-equipped squadron began to arrive at Westover in February 1961 and by mid-April the 76th was fully equipped. Unfortunately the 76th, when needed in Florida, was in Massachusetts.[2]

On 7 April 1961, the JCS, through CONAD, ordered a two-week test of "Southern Tip," beginning 12 April. Tyndall AFB, Florida, the ADC weapons testing center, deployed six F-102A aircraft to Homestead, where two interceptors were maintained in five-minute-alert status at all times. The Tyndall aircraft were not assigned to any particular interceptor squadron, but were from a pool maintained for test and training purposes. They were, however, tactically configured and were armed. The makeshift "Southern Tip"

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2. Memo for Record, "76 FIS Capability to Support F/TF-102 Aircraft," n.d., ca. 31 Jan 1961 [Doc 352 in Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1961]; Msg 26MDC 2-3, 26 AD to ADC, 10 Feb 1961 [Doc 354 in Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1961]; Minutes, Program Control Committee, ADC, 25 Apr 1961 [Doc 356 in Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1961].

air defense system was in being when the abortive "Bay of Pigs" invasion of Cuba by anti-Castro forces occurred on 17 April.[3]

The two-week suitability test of the south Florida defenses did not end on 26 April as originally scheduled. The following day the JCS directed that "Southern Tip" continue indefinitely. Also on 27 April 1961, CONAD forwarded to the JCS a four-phase plan which would result in establishment of a permanent air defense system in the area. The phases were as follows:

Phase I	"Southern Tip"
Phase II	Extended Contingency Operations
Phase III	Minimum Permanent Installation
Phase IV	Permanent Full Capability

The JCS agreed to implementation of Phase II on 29 May 1961, but added that action on Phases III and IV would have to await further political and military developments.[4]

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3. Msg ADOOP-P 741, ADC to USAF, 8 Apr 1961 [Doc 358 in Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1961]; Msg 320C0-260, 32 AD to ADC, 19 Apr 1961 [Doc 11 in 32 AD Study, "The Air Defense Build-Up in Southern Florida, January-December 1961," hereafter cited as "32 AD Study."

4. Hist of NORAD, Jan-Jun 1961, pp. 84-88; Ltr, CONAD to JCS, "Air Defense in the Southern Florida Area," 27 Jun 1961 [Doc 13 in 32 AD Study); Msg COOP-X 162, CONAD to JCS, 13 May 1961 [Doc 100 in Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1961].

Within a short time, Tyndall began to notice the absence of six F-102A aircraft and in the middle of May obtained ADC permission to reduce the number deployed to Homestead to three. This number was increased to four in July when aircraft of the 482nd FIS from Seymour Johnson AFB in North Carolina arrived in Florida to fulfill the ADC commitment. While repairs were being made to the Homestead runways between July 1961 and January 1962, the "Southern Tip" interceptors were based at Miami International Airport.[5]

Four interceptors, of course, constituted the slimmest of token forces, a situation both ADC and CONAD were anxious to correct. One plan, broached in February 1962, called for the transfer of a squadron of F-104 aircraft from the Air National Guard to ADC for use in Florida. ADC had at

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5. Msg 730DC X188E, 73 AD to MOADS, 18 May 1961 [Doc 360 in Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1961]; Msg ADIRP-E 1077, ADC to USAF, 23 May 1961 [Doc 361 in Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1961]; Msg ADODC 1109, ADC to 73 AD, 26 May 1961 [Doc 362 in Hist of ADC Jan-Jun 1961]; Msg ADOOP-WI 1179, ADC to 73 AD, 6 Jun 1961 [Doc 363 in Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1961]; Msg AFOOP-BU 76498, USAF to ADC, 8 Jun 1961 [Doc 364 in Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1961]; Msg ADOOP-WI 1334, ADC to 26 AD, 24 Jun 1961 [Doc 369 in Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1961]; Msg ADMDC 1969, ADC to SAC, 15 Sep 1961 [Doc 774 in Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1961]; Msg ADOOP-WI 2078, ADC to SAC, 27 Sep 1961 [Doc 775 in Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1961]; Msg ADLSP 2354, ADC to 26 AD, 25 Oct 1961 [Doc 776 in Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1961]; RCS: 1AF-V14, ADC, 2 Feb 1962 [HRF].

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one time utilized F-104 aircraft, but had released them to the ANG in 1960 because the F-104 did not include a fire control system sufficiently sophisticated to make the weapons system an adequate all-weather interceptor. The F-104, however, was ideally suited for the duty anticipated in Florida. USAF showed interest in this proposal, although not all USAF staff offices agreed with ADC as to the manner in which the ANG F-104 aircraft should be used. There was one school of thought which held that the F-104's should be retained by the ANG and that the Homestead alert should be maintained by rotation of ANG aircraft and crews. ADC strongly disapproved of this suggestion, countering with the recommendation that all ANG F-104 aircraft be transferred to ADC. When that happened, ADC proposed to move the 71st FIS from Selfridge to Homestead and re-equip it with F-104 aircraft. The remaining ANG F-104's were to be used to replace the F-102A interceptors of the 331st FIS at Webb.[6]

USAF finally adopted the ADC position in early summer and forwarded the ADC proposal to the Department of Defense. Despite repeated inquiries on the part of ADC, the DOD delayed

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6. Msg ADCCS 617, ADC to USAF, 2 Mar.1962 [DOC 1]; Msg AFOOP 72866, USAF to SAC, 23 Mar 1962 [DOC 2]; Msg ADCCR 1072, ADC to USAF, 19 Apr 1962 [DOC 3].

[redacted]

its decision month after month until mid-October, when a negative decision was rendered. Probably because the situation in Cuba would not permit delay, DOD decided to shift a squadron of Navy interceptors from San Diego to Key West, rather than authorize re-equipment of the 71st FIS following a transfer from Selfridge to Homestead. The Navy unit was ready to move almost immediately. Re-equipment of the 71st FIS with F-104's obtained from the ANG would have required at least several weeks. On the other hand, DOD approval of the USAF/ADC/CONAD proposal in July would have resulted in combat-ready F-104 aircraft being available in South Florida when the Cuban crisis developed in October. As it was, ADC had four F-102A interceptors in the "Southern Tip" area when the crisis broke.[7]

The first hint that something extraordinary was afoot came 17 October 1962 when key members of the ADC Operations staff were called into an impromptu conference by CONAD Operations. At that time the ADC people were told

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7. [redacted] Msg ADMDC 1946, ADC to AFLC, 20 Jul 1962 [DOC 4]; Msg ADODC 2111, ADC to USAF, 9 Aug 1962 [DOC 5]; [redacted] Msg ADOOP-WI 2240, ADC to 32 AD, 23 Aug 1962 [DOC 6]; Msg ADOOP-WI 2445, ADC to USAF, 12 Sep 1962 [DOC 7]; Msg 82788, USAF to SAC, 14 Sep 1962 [DOC 8]; [redacted] Msg ADOOP-WI 2800, ADC to Air Divs, 19 Oct 1962 [DOC 9].

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that the JCS had directed CONAD to strengthen the interceptor force in south Florida. CONAD was in the process of writing an operations order, issued the next day, that called for ADC to increase the strength of the F-102A unit at Homestead (the detachment from the 482nd FIS) from four to 18 and move 12 F-106A aircraft of the 48th FIS from Langley AFB, Virginia, to Patrick AFB, Florida, by 0800 hours (EST) on 20 October. In addition, ADC was asked to make sure that the 17 F-101B, 18 F-106A and 9 F-102A interceptors at Tyndall were made ready and alerted for possible CONAD orders. The interceptor contingents left Seymour Johnson and Langley on 18 October, "turned around" at Tyndall and arrived at Homestead and Patrick, respectively, on 19 October, well ahead of the CONAD time limit. The ADC interceptor force in Florida had grown from 4 aircraft to 74 in about 48 hours.[8]

On the supposition that the two squadrons, plus the Tyndall aircraft, might be insufficient to meet the threat from Cuba, ADC warned the 32nd Air Division on 19 October to be ready to shift the F-102A aircraft of the 331st FIS

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8. Ltr, ADC to 25 AD, "Briefing on Participation of ADC in Present Contingency Operations," 16 Nov 1962 [HRF]; CONAD Operation Plan 1-62, 18 Oct 1962 [HRF]; Monograph, "Contingency Operations of the 73 Air Division (Weapons), 15 October-31 December 1962," p. 16 [HRF].

from Webb AFB, Texas, to Florida on short notice. Either ADC was omniscient or had pre-knowledge, because the following day, 20 October, the JCS requested, by telephone, that CONAD re-examine its plans for the defense of the southeastern United States. On 21 October, CONAD recommended to the JCS that certain Air National Guard units in the southeast be federalized and that two additional regular interceptor squadrons be moved into the area. CONAD movement orders were almost concurrently given to ADC. The 71st FIS from Selfridge AFB, Michigan, was able to move 12 F-106A's into Patrick before the end of 21 October. The last of the 18 F-102A interceptors from Webb arrived at Homestead in the pre-dawn darkness of 22 October. On 21 October, Tyndall was told to be ready to put six F-102A's, eight F-106A's and eight F-101B's on five-minute alert within an hour of notification.[9]

Thus was the interceptor force deployed in Florida -- two squadrons of F-106A's at Patrick, two squadrons of F-102A's

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9. Msg ADOOP-W 2801, ADC to 32 AD, 19 Oct 1962 [HRF]; Msg COOP-P 1022, CONAD to JCS, 21 Oct 1962 [HRF]; Msg ADCCR 62-272, ADC to AFLC, 21 Oct 1962 [HRF]; Msg ADCCR 62-274, ADC to 30 AD, 21 Oct 1962 [HRF]; ADC Historical Study No. 15, "The Air Defense Command in the Cuban Crisis," undated but early 1963, p. 27, (hereafter cited as "ADC Historical Study No. 15").

at Homestead, plus 22 ready aircraft at Tyndall -- when President John F. Kennedy announced to the public the evening of 22 October that Russian missiles had been emplaced in Cuba and that the United States intended to have them removed.

The distinct possibility that the direct confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union would result in full-scale nuclear war made it prudent to disperse a considerable proportion of the interceptor force in accord with previously laid plans. At noon on the day of the President's speech, therefore, ADC ordered implementation of the dispersal plan. In seven hours, 167 interceptors from 26 squadrons had been dispersed to 17 bases. The dispersed aircraft carried their nuclear armament, the first time in the history of the command that such flights had been ordered.[10]

Unfortunately, the dispersal plan was still in the early stages of development at the time of the Cuban crisis, having been first proposed in 1961. Use of proposed dispersal bases in Canada had not been approved by the Canadian government, nor had the Navy approved ADC use of Navy air

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10. ADC Historical Study No. 15, p. 30.

facilities. As a consequence, many ADC squadrons dispersed to "interim" bases that would not be used when the formal dispersal plan was completed. Also, where "permanent" dispersal bases were used, facilities were inadequate. Later dispersal exercises were likely to be much more comfortable than that of 22 October 1962. At any rate, dispersal was accomplished as follows:[11]

Sq	Home Base	Permanent Dispersal Base	Dispersal Base 22 Oct 1962
498	Spokane IAP, Wash.	Calgary, Alta.	Paine AFB, Wash.
318	McChord AFB, Wash.	Comox, B.C.	Paine AFB, Wash.
82	Travis AFB, Cal.	Siskiyou, Cal.	Siskiyou, Cal.
83	Hamilton AFB, Cal.	Lemoore NAS, Cal.	Kingsley Fld, Ore.
84	Hamilton AFB, Cal.	Lemoore NAS, Cal.	Kingsley Fld, Ore.
456	Castle AFB, Cal.	Fresno, Cal.	Fresno, Cal.
15	Davis-Monthan AFB, Ariz.	Williams AFB, Ariz.	Williams AFB, Ariz.
29	Malmstrom AFB, Mont.	Saskatoon, Sask.	Billings, Mont.
13	Glasgow AFB, Mont.	Saskatoon, Sask.	Billings, Mont.
5	Minot AFB, N.D.	Portage la Prairie, Man.	Hector Fld, N.D.
18	Grand Forks AFB, N.D.	Hector Fld, N.D.	Hector Fld, N.D.
11	Duluth MAP, Minn.	Portage la Prairie, Man.	Volk Fld, Wis.
325	Truax Fld, Wis.	Des Moines, Ia.	Des Moines, Ia.
62	K.I. Sawyer AFB, Mich.	Hector Fld, N.D.	Phelps-Collins Fld, Mich.
438	Kincheloe AFB, Mich.	Volk Fld, Wis.	Phelps-Collins Fld, Mich.
445	Wurtsmith AFB, Mich.	Phelps-Collins Fld, Mich.	Phelps-Collins Fld, Mich.

11. ADC maps of planned and actual dispersal, 22 Oct 1962 [HRF].

[redacted]

Sq	Home Base	Permanent Dispersal Base	Dispersal Base 22 Oct 1962
27	Loring AFB, Me.	Chatham, N.B.	Olmsted AFB, Pa.
75	Dow AFB, Me.	Bagotville, Que.	Niagara Falls, N.Y.
76	Westover AFB, Mass.	Burlington, Vt.	Burlington, Vt.
49	Griffiss AFB, N.Y.	Val D'Or, Que.	Niagara Falls, N.Y.
539	McGuire AFB, N.J.	Olmsted AFB, Pa.	Olmsted AFB, Pa.
98	Dover AFB, Del.	Atlantic City, N.J.	Atlantic City, N.J.
85	Andrews AFB, Md.	Patuxent River NAS, Md.	Atlantic City, N.J.
326	Richards-Gebaur AFB, Mo.	Grand Island, Neb.	Grand Island, Neb.
87	Lockbourne AFB, Ohio	Phelps-Collins Fld, Mich.	Clinton County AFB, Ohio
319	Bunker Hill AFB, Ind.	Des Moines, Ia.	Hulman Fld, Ind.

The 331st FIS from Webb remained at Homestead only about a week before it was replaced by the 325th FIS from Truax. Since none of the interceptors deployed to Florida expected to use nuclear weapons, the use of the 325th was logical since it was the only F-102A squadron which had not yet been modified to carry the GAR-11 nuclear missile as primary armament. The 325th was notified of this commitment on 26 October and the move to Homestead was completed the following day. The 482nd remained at Homestead, its aircraft being fitted with 2.75-inch rockets.[12]

Sixty interceptors were deployed to Florida in the first flush of the Cuban crisis, but it did not prove possible

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12. Operations Log, ADC Command Post, 26 Oct 1962 [HRF].

[redacted]

to maintain the full complement at all times during the month the deployment was in force. The trend as regards aircraft on hand was steadily downward as the effect of extensive flying began to tell on both machines and men. The first week an average of 49 aircraft were on hand. In the first week of November the average dropped to 45, then to 39 the following week. During the last 12 days of the crisis period that ended 23 November, the average was 35 aircraft. The day-to-day situation is given in the following table:[13]

DEPLOYMENT OF ADC INTERCEPTORS IN FLORIDA
22 October - 23 November 1962

Date	Patrick AFB (F-106A)	Homestead AFB (F-102A)	Total
22 Oct	24	36	60
23 Oct	16	30	46
24 Oct	23	36	59
25 Oct	23	29	52
26 Oct	17	24	41
27 Oct	21	30	51
28 Oct	21	15	36
30 Oct	20	27	47
31 Oct	22	23	45
1 Nov	19	26	45
2 Nov	19	26	45
3 Nov	20	24	44
4 Nov	17	26	43
5 Nov	17	26	43
6 Nov	16	26	42

13. ADC Force Status Reports, 22 Oct-23 Nov 1962 [HRF].

[redacted]

Date	Patrick AFB (F-106A)	Homestead AFB (F-102A)	Total
7 Nov	20	15	35
8 Nov	18	20	38
9 Nov	19	21	40
10 Nov	16	19	35
12 Nov	18	15	33
13 Nov	18	18	36
14 Nov	18	15	33
15 Nov	15	15	30
16 Nov	17	24	41
17 Nov	17	20	37
18 Nov	17	13	30
19 Nov	18	17	35
20 Nov	17	17	34
21 Nov	20	23	43
22 Nov	22	16	38
23 Nov	22	5	27

A similar attrition prevailed among the dispersed interceptors. Nearly one-third of those originally dispersed on 22 October were no longer in that status three weeks later. Shortages of facilities and supplies at dispersal bases and exhaustion of aircrews and maintenance men combined to drive down the number of dispersed aircraft as the days went by. The nature of the decline was as follows:[14]

DISPERSAL OF ADC INTERCEPTORS
23 October-14 November 1962

Date	F-102A	F-101B	F-106A	Total
23 Oct	31	68	66	165
24 Oct	28	68	61	157

14. Ibid.

[redacted]

Date	F-102A	F-101B	F-106A	Total
25 Oct	28	68	61	157
26 Oct	29	68	54	151
27 Oct	26	68	59	153
28 Oct	19	68	60	147
30 Oct	15	66	66	147
31 Oct	15	66	62	143
1 Nov	15	64	61	140
2 Nov	15	64	56	135
3 Nov	15	64	60	139
4 Nov	19	59	58	136
5 Nov	23	58	54	135
6 Nov	23	56	52	131
7 Nov	23	60	54	137
8 Nov	20	59	50	129
9 Nov	20	59	50	129
10 Nov	18	59	42	119
12 Nov	21	53	41	115
13 Nov	19	53	40	112
14 Nov	18	54	40	112

After 14 November, piecemeal permission was granted to recall dispersed interceptors to home bases and within 10 days dispersal was ended.

Although the use of Air National Guard units was not contemplated when the original CONAD operations order was issued on 18 October, the revision of 20 October called for the federalization of the 159th FIS at Jacksonville, Florida; the 122nd FIS at New Orleans; the 111th FIS at Houston; the 157th FIS at McEntire ANG Base, South Carolina; and the 151st FIS at McGhee-Tyson Field, Tennessee. It was proposed that F-104 aircraft from the last two squadrons be

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placed on alert status at Key West. Federalization was not authorized, however, although ADC took the precaution of issuing conditional federalization orders on 29 October. These orders were never given effect and the Air National Guard took no part in the Cuban crisis.[15]

The immediate crisis over Cuba abated in late November 1962 when it appeared that the Russians had been sincere in agreeing to withdraw their offensive missiles from the island. The situation did not return to pre-Cuba normalcy in Florida, however. Temporarily, until a permanent air defense posture for this part of the country could be devised, approximately 20 F-106A interceptors of the 71st, 94th and 48th squadrons were retained at Patrick and 20 F-102A aircraft of the 325th FIS were kept at Homestead.[16]

Such a plan, which involved the permanent transfer of the 71st FIS from Selfridge to Homestead, was submitted in December 1962 and approved by the Department of Defense on 12 January 1963. During the approval process, ADC had decided that total air defense would be better served by

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15. Msg COOP-P 1022, CONAD to JCS, 21 Oct 1962 [HRF]; Msg ADODC 2900, ADC to 26 AD, 26 Oct 1962 [DOC 10]; ADC SO G-113 thru G-124, 29 Oct 1962 [HRF].

16. [redacted] Msg ADOOP-WI 3302, ADC to 32 AD, 30 Nov 1962 [DOC 11].

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moving the 319th FIS from Bunker Hill AFB, Indiana, to Homestead, rather than the Selfridge unit. The Department of Defense had no objection to this change in plan, but added other refinements of its own. The Homestead squadron, DOD believed, should be equipped with F-104 rather than F-106 aircraft, since the F-104 offered superior performance in fighter-against-fighter combat. ADC had handed its F-104's down to the ANG in 1960, because the F-104 was deficient in terms of fire control system and was therefore an inadequate all-weather interceptor. This was deemed a relatively unimportant factor in Florida, since Cuba did not have a bomber force of consequence. Cuban intruders were likely to be flying Russian MIG fighters, which made speed and altitude capability of utmost importance. To achieve this type of defense opposite Cuba it was necessary to retrieve the F-104's from the ANG squadrons at McEntire (South Carolina) and McGhee-Tyson (Tennessee) and replace them with F-102A aircraft. The second squadron of F-104's was to go to the 331st FIS at Webb AFB, Texas. The necessary F-102A's for the ANG were to be provided by inactivating the 76th FIS at Westover AFB, Massachusetts, and by reducing the number of interceptors at Thule, Greenland, from 12 to 6.

It was anticipated in January 1963 that the 319th would be operational with the F-104 at Homestead by 15 June 1963.[17]

A temporary hitch developed in this minor redeployment action on 27 March 1963 when USAF ordered that all movement be halted. An unnamed member of Congress insisted that he had not been informed of the pending organizational changes and asked that all activity be stopped until the reasoning behind the changes was satisfactorily explained. This was accomplished in a matter of days and the move of the 319th FIS and associated changes were allowed to continue. The 319th FIS assumed alert status (but not fully operational status) with F-104 aircraft at Homestead on 15 April 1963.[18]

The ability of ADC to rapidly deploy additional fighter strength into Florida was tested again on 22-23 May 1963 when 24 F-106 aircraft from the 11th FIS at Duluth, Minnesota, and the 48th FIS at Langley were ordered to Patrick. The deployment order was given at 0430 hours (EST)

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17. Msg AFOOP-E (no number), USAF to ADC, 15 Jan 1963 [DOC 12]; ADC Operations Plan 2-63, "Redistribution of Interceptor Resources," 22 Jan 1963 [DOC 13]; Msg ADLSP 229, ADC to Air Divs, 24 Jan 1963 [DOC 14].

18. [redacted] Msg ADCCS 951, ADC to USAF, 29 Mar 1963 [DOC 15]; Msg ADMSS-EM 967, ADC to Westover AFB et al, 29 Mar 1963 [DOC 16]; Msg MNOOP 2911, MOADS to 32 AD, 16 Apr 1963 [DOC 17].

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on 22 May. All 24 aircraft were in place at Patrick by 1049 hours (EST). This group conducted training interceptions under SAGE direction before returning to home bases on 24 May. The exercise was considered highly successful, although there were some complaints about the comparatively slow reaction times of supporting transport aircraft.[19]

Meanwhile, CONAD began planning for the substitution of ADC interceptors for the contingent of Marine Corps F-4B aircraft to be withdrawn from Key West on 15 June 1963. The 482nd FIS at Seymour Johnson, which provided the F-102A aircraft for the detachment maintained at Homestead at the beginning of the Cuban crisis, was also selected to honor this commitment. Six F-102A interceptors from the 482nd began operating from Key West as of 15 June. Key West operations were of a hand-to-mouth nature and of somewhat indefinite duration, because the Naval Air Station did not have the facilities required for permanent support of Air Force aircraft. ADC estimated that the facilities required to support six F-102A's permanently at Key West would cost about $2 million. Neither the Navy commander at Key West, ADC nor USAF was immediately

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19. Msg ADOOP-WI 1904, ADC to 26, 30 and 32 AD, 22 May 1963 [DOC 18]; Msg ADOOP-WI 1924, ADC to USAF, 22 May 1963 [DOC 19]; Msg 30-OOP-1 S-0873-63, 30 AD to ADC, 29 May 1963 [DOC 20]; Msg 26OOP-WF 63-10641, 26 AD to ADC, 29 May 1963 [DOC 21].

sure where the necessary funds would come from. At any rate, at the middle of 1963 ADC was furnishing 30 interceptors (24 F-104's at Homestead and 6 F-102A's at Key West) for the defense of southern Florida where only four aircraft had been earmarked for that purpose prior to October 1962.[20]

In July 1963, ADC re-cast its contingency plan for defense of Florida to emphasize deployment to both Patrick and Key West and shift responsibility for the provision of the required aircraft. Under the revised plan, the 1st Fighter Wing (71st and 94th FIS) at Selfridge replaced the 11th FIS as the source of 12 F-106A's for movement to Patrick. The 48th FIS (Langley) continued to shoulder the responsibility for the other 12 aircraft. In addition, the 482nd FIS was told to increase the number of F-102A's at Key West from 6 to 20 in the event of another crisis involving Cuba. Assignments were changed, however, as the year went along. In September, the 48th FIS became involved in the Interceptor Improvement Program (IIP) and the commitment of the

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20. Msg COOP-P X-118, CONAD to ADC, 19 Mar 1963 [DOC 22]; Msg ADODC 2026, ADC to USAF, 4 Jun 1963 [DOC 23]; Msg ADODC 2067, ADC to 26 and 32 AD, 7 Jun 1963 [DOC 24]; Msg ADODC 2079, ADC to 26 and 32 AD, 8 Jun 1963 [DOC 25]; Msg ADODC 2118, ADC to 26 and 32 AD, 13 Jun 1963 [DOC 26]; Msg AFXOPN 71998, USAF to ADC, 19 Jun 1963 [DOC 27].

1st Fighter Wing was raised from 12 to 18 F-106A aircraft. The other six interceptors to be deployed to Patrick were to come from the 95th FIS, Dover AFB, Delaware, between 1 October and 15 November 1963 and from the 539th FIS, McGuire AFB, N.J., between 15 November and 10 December. The 48th was to again assume the commitment on 10 December 1963.[21]

In December 1963, the contingency plan was further modified to specify that the 325th FIS at Truax Field, Wisconsin, would be liable for the emergency duty at Key West if the 482nd was unable to do so. The same change in plan also created a third line of defense for Key West, obligating the 82nd FIS at Travis AFB, California, for emergency duty in Florida if the 325th failed to act.[22]

Since the reason for deployment of F-104 fighters to Homestead was improvement of fighter-against-fighter capability in southern Florida, ADC had come to the conclusion by late

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21. [redacted]ADC Operations Plan 33-63, "Southern Tip Contingency Plan," 1 Jul 1963 [HRF]; Msg 26OOP-W 63-11361, 26 AD to WAADS, 30 Sep 1963 [DOC 28].

22. [redacted] Msg ADOOP 5900, ADC to Air Divs, 12 Dec 1963 [DOC 29]; [redacted], Msg 30-OOP-12-08S, 30 AD to 28 AD, 16 Dec 1963 [DOC 30]; Msg 25OPP 732G, 25 AD to POADS, 19 Dec 1963 [DOC 31]; [redacted] Msg ADOOP-WI 5996, ADC to 25 and 30 AD, 19 Dec 1963 [DOC 32].

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June of 1963 that this purpose would be better served by providing the 319th FIS with late-model F-104G aircraft in place of the F-104A aircraft retrieved from the ANG. USAF replied, in October, that ADC could have been supplied with more modern versions of the F-104 if the Department of Defense had approved the USAF request to maintain an F-104 production line in operation. USAF contended that it was wise to keep open a second source of fighter aircraft in addition to the line which was currently producing the Republic F-105. DOD, however, did not see the situation in the same light and ordered that F-104 production end as scheduled. Consequently, ADC would have to do the best it could with the F-104A.[23]

Nevertheless, the fighter-against-fighter capability of the F-104A was to be enhanced by addition of the M-61 20-mm. gun. These aircraft, when possessed earlier by ADC, had been armed with the GAR-8 (AIM-9B) Sidewinder missile. This heat-seeker was effective against bombers, but ineffective in fighter combat. Hence it was deemed essential to equip the ADC aircraft with fighter armament, the

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23. Msg AFORQ 76836, USAF to ADC, 9 Jul 1963 [DOC 33]; Msg ADLDC 5280, ADC to USAF, 14 Oct 1963 [DOC 34]; Msg AFORQDW 63875, USAF to ADC, 18 Oct 1963 [DOC 35].

M-61 gun. This modification began in February 1964. While this modification was taking place, the JCS directed TAC to furnish the 319th with eight F-104C aircraft, armed with the M-61 gun, from the 479th Tactical Fighter Wing, George AFB, California. The TAC fighters arrived at Homestead on 5 February 1964 and were returned to George by 30 April.[24]

In late February of 1964, ADC conducted another test of its ability to deploy an interceptor force to south Florida and carry on air defense operations under the direction of the Montgomery (Alabama) Air Defense Sector once the force was in place. This was Exercise "Arawak Spear." The 48th FIS was to deploy 12 F-106's to Patrick and the 482nd six additional F-102A's to Key West. The 444th FIS at Charleston AFB, South Carolina, was to remain in place, but was to come under the operational control of MOADS during this exercise. The 159th FIS of the Florida ANG (Jacksonville) was also to provide eight F-102A's for "Arawak Spear." The exercise began at 1000 hours (EST) on 26 February. The F-102A

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24. Msg ADMLP 390, ADC to TAC, 4 Feb 1964 [DOC 36]; Msg ADOOP-WI 401, ADC to 26 AD, 5 Feb 1964 [DOC 37]; Msg ADMLP 409, ADC to 26 AD, 6 Feb 1964 [DOC 38]; Msg ADODC 1239, ADC to CONAD, 8 Apr 1964 [DOC 39]; Msg ADOOP-W 1310, ADC to 26 AD, 15 Apr 1964 [DOC 40]; Msg ADODC 1340, ADC to CONAD, 17 Apr 1964 [DOC 41]; Msg ADODC 1368, ADC to CONAD, 21 Apr 1964 [DOC 42].

aircraft from the 482nd were in place at Key West by 1205 hours, the contingent of F-106A's from the 48th completing the move to Patrick by 1455 hours. Despite adverse weather, this force flew 116 sorties and watched, at various periods, the Atlantic Coast between West Palm Beach and Fort Myers and between Patrick AFB and Savannah, Georgia, as well as the Gulf Coast between Cross City and Tampa. No special problems arose during the exercise and "Arawak Spear" was regarded as both successful and instructive.[25]

The "Southern Tip" plan was revised again in March 1964, but few significant changes resulted. The 48th FIS and 1st Fighter Wing were still obligated to move 12 F-106A's each to Patrick in the event of an emergency in the southeast. The 482nd FIS continued to be obligated to increase its force of F-102A's at Key West from 6 to 20 in time of trouble. The new plan, however, formalized a system of substitutions for the units holding primary responsibility for emergency deployment. This had been done before, but in the form of

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25. [redacted] Msg ADOOP-W 765, ADC to 26 AD, 26 Feb 1964 [DOC 43]; [redacted] Msg ADODC 807, ADC to 26 AD, 28 Feb 1964 [DOC 44]; [redacted] Msg ADODC 824, ADC to USAF, 28 Feb 1964 [DOC 45]; [redacted] Msg 32CHCR 6403-039, 32 CONAD Rgn to CONAD, 4 Mar 1964 [DOC 46].

[redacted]

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miscellaneous directives. Now the whole plan was brought together in one place. The substitute for the 48th was the 95th FIS at Dover. The 539th FIS at McGuire stood behind the 1st Fighter Wing, while the 325th FIS at Truax was the stand-in for the 482nd. The 331st FIS at Webb AFB, Texas, was to provide F-104 aircraft to supplement those of the 319th FIS at Homestead. In May 1964, shortly after the revised plan took effect, ADC alerted affected units that a re-play of the Cuban crisis of October 1962 might be imminent. "Current events," said the ADC message of 7 May, "make the implementation of ADC OPLAN 33-64, Southern Tip, quite probable."[26]

This alarm was short-lived, however, and within a week the normal condition of readiness in the southeast was resumed. As of the end of June 1964, 18 F-104A aircraft of the 319th FIS were available at Homestead, supplemented by four similar aircraft from the 331st FIS at Webb. The detachment from Webb was expected to remain at Homestead until all aircraft of the 319th had been modified to carry the M-61 gun. Six F-102A's of the 482nd FIS continued to

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26. Msg ADODC 1530, ADC to CONAD and Air Divs, 7 May 1964 [DOC 47]; [redacted] ADC Operations Plan 33-64, "Southern Tip," 1 Mar 1964 [DOC 48].

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stand alert at Key West. Other elements of the ADC interceptor force stood ready for emergency duty in Florida on short notice.[27]

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27. [redacted] Apex Status Report, ADC, 30 Jun 1964 [HRF].

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CHAPTER TWO

DEPLOYMENT TO ALASKA

Barely had the Cuban crisis subsided into a condition of wary watchfulness before a new alarm bell rang in Alaska. On 15 March 1963, two Soviet aircraft invaded United States air space over Alaska. The F-102A interceptors available to the Alaskan Air Command proved inadequate to challenge the invaders, who turned out to sea after an uninterrupted flight over coastal areas of Alaska. The Alaskan air commander was understandably concerned over his inability to intercept high-performance aircraft of possible hostile intent and recommended that the 40 F-102A's in Alaska be replaced by F-4C advanced tactical fighters. NORAD concurred, 4 April, that improved interceptors were needed in Alaska,

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but did not agree that the F-4C was the answer, since the need was immediate and deliveries of the F-4C were not scheduled until the spring of 1964. NORAD believed that either the F-101B or the F-106A would be an improvement over the F-102A, however. Later in April, though, in response to a request for recommendations from the JCS, NORAD said at least a portion of the Alaska interceptor force should be replaced by F-4C's or by F-101B's or F-106A's furnished by ADC on a rotational basis. NORAD added, bringing up a perennial topic, that the ultimate requirement in Alaska was the IMI. A month later, 28 May, the JCS concluded that immediate improvement of the interceptor force in Alaska was necessary and directed USAF to coordinate the necessary action with NORAD and CINCAL (Commander-in-Chief, Alaska). USAF appointed ADC as Air Force executive agent in this matter.[28]

During a 19-20 June conference the interested parties decided that this requirement would be met by deploying eight ADC F-106A interceptors to Alaska on a temporary basis, effective 15 July. NORAD gave the implementation order

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28. Msg NASV-M X051, NORAD to ADC, 10 May 1963 [DOC 49]; Msg NASV-M X052, NORAD to ADC, 10 May 1963 [DOC 50]; Hist of NORAD, Jan-Jun 1963, pp. 63-65.

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shortly after the decision was reached and on 25 June the 25th Air Division was informed that it had been chosen to fulfill this commitment. The 25th Air Division, in turn, passed the assignment along to the 325th Fighter Wing (318th and 498th FIS) at McChord AFB, Washington. The plan (Operation "White Shoes") called for the deploying unit to maintain two aircraft on readiness alert at King Salmon and Galena, with the remainder based at Elmendorf AFB. "White Shoes," incidentally, was intended as an interim answer to the air defense problem in Alaska, pending determination of a permanent solution. ADC estimated this emergency deployment would last 60 days.[29]

When the deployment to Alaska actually occurred in July, the number of aircraft involved was raised to 10. Because of transport difficulties, the complete detachment did not reach Elmendorf until 17 July 1963.[30]

With the most pressing need filled by the deployment of F-106's, the matter of a permanent solution was attacked

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29. Weekly Activity Report, ADC, ADLPP-P, 24 Jun 1963 [HRF]; [redacted] Msg ADOOP-P 2234, ADC to USAF, 25 Jun 1963 [DOC 51]; [redacted] Msg ADODC 2229, ADC to USAF, 25 Jun 1963 [DOC 52]; NOFORN EX CANADA, Msg 25OOP-T 360-G, 25 AD to MATS, 28 Jun 1963 [DOC 53].

30. Hist of 25 AD, Jul-Dec 1963, p. 99.

[redacted]

[redacted]

by representatives of NORAD, ADC and Alaskan Air Command (AAC) in September, but the results were inconclusive. AAC insisted that it could not accept the permanent assignment of either F-106 or F-101B aircraft from the ADC inventory because of a lack of facilities and other, unspecified, considerations. Therefore, ADC proposed to continue the "White Shoes" deployment indefinitely, a period ADC believed would cover at least two more years. ADC also recommended that the number of aircraft deployed be cut to eight and that regular within-Alaska deployment to King Salmon and Galena be stopped because of short runways and highly dangerous operating conditions. It was recommended that F-106's be dispersed to these two satellite bases only when the commander of the Alaska NORAD Region believed an urgent tactical requirement existed.[31]

The ADC proposal was not acceptable to USAF, however, and on 26 September 1963 USAF told NORAD that the indefinite

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31. [redacted], Msg ADODC 3035, ADC to USAF, 28 Aug 1963 [DOC 54]; [redacted], Msg ADODC 5054, ADC to USAF, 20 Sep 1963 [DOC 55]; [redacted] Msg ADLPP 5078, ADC to USAF, 24 Sep 1963 [DOC 56]; Msg ADOOP-WI 5138, ADC to AAC, 30 Sep 1963 [DOC 57]; [redacted] Msg ADOOP-WI 5307, ADC to USAF, 16 Oct 1963 [DOC 58].

deployment of F-106's to Alaska could not be supported from a cost effectiveness standpoint. USAF suggested that "White Shoes" be modified to call for deployment of F-106's only during times of peak Soviet activity. It was also recommended that facilities within Alaska be improved to permit optimum use of F-102's assigned there. CINCAL responded with a request that the full-time deployment of F-106's continue, since it was impossible to determine when "peak Soviet activity" would occur. Further, CINCAL explained that only the airfields at Nome, Point Barrow and Umiat could possibly be improved to the point where they could be used by F-102 interceptors and it was estimated that such improvements would cost $61 million. CINCAL did not think the gain in defense capability would be sufficient to justify the cost. The NORAD reply was in a similar vein, coming to the conclusion that, pending the availability of the IMI or the F-4C, continuing deployment of F-106's was the only logical alternative. USAF capitulated in December 1963, approving the continuation of "White Shoes." At the same time, USAF expressed the opinion that "White Shoes" amounted to a very limited improvement of air-defense

capability in Alaska and that it was studying other alternatives such as the feasibility of using the F-4C.[32]

Meanwhile, maintenance support of the F-106's in Alaska was putting such a severe strain on the 325th Fighter Wing at McChord that its operational capacity, as revealed by a December Operational Readiness Inspection, was being affected. ADC therefore requested that AAC assume greater responsibility for maintenance of the F-106's in Alaska. USAF agreed that this was desirable and issued the necessary instructions. These actions, however, did not produce the desired improvement and on 1 February 1964 ADC activated a permanent maintenance detachment of the 325th Fighter Wing in Alaska, increasing the manpower allotment of the 325th in order to make this possible.[33]

The 325th Fighter Wing got a measure of relief in March 1964 when it was allowed to stand down from the "White Shoes" deployment while participating in the Interceptor

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32. Hist of NORAD, Jul-Dec 1963, pp. 80-82; [redacted], Msg ADOOP 5919, ADC to 25 AD, 13 Dec 1963 [DOC 59].

33. Msg ADMLP-B 5816, ADC to AAC, 5 Dec 1963 [DOC 60]; [redacted] Msg ADMSS-WA1 5997, ADC to 25 AD, 19 Dec 1963 [DOC 61]; [redacted] Msg ADOOP-WI 6025, ADC to 25 AD, 20 Dec 1963 [DOC 62]; Msg ADODC 6079, ADC to USAF, 27 Dec 1963 [DOC 63]; Msg ADMSS-WA1 6092, ADC to 25 AD, 30 Dec 1963 [DOC 64]; [redacted] Msg ADCCR 373, ADC to 25 AD, 31 Jan 1964 [DOC 65].

Improvement Program. The "White Shoes" commitment was assumed between 1 March and 1 June by 1st Fighter Wing (71st and 94th FIS) from Selfridge, an organization that was also involved in the "Southern Tip" operation. The 1st Fighter Wing, incidentally, was fulfilling the ADC obligation in Alaska when that area was struck by a major earthquake on 27 March 1964. The 1st Fighter Wing sustained damage to two F-106's. Seventeen AAC F-102's were temporarily put out of action.[34]

Another attempt was made in June 1964 to provide a "permanent" solution for the problem of Alaska air defense. This time USAF recommended that F-102's be withdrawn from Alaska and replaced, on a permanent basis, with a squadron of F-106's from the ADC inventory. ADC did not concur with this recommendation, especially since recent (May 1964) Tentative Force Guidance from the Department of Defense had shown ADC with an interceptor force of 20 squadrons at the end of Fiscal 1967. Anyway, ADC added, the limitations

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34. [redacted], Msg ADCCR 373, ADC to 25 AD, 31 Jan 1964 [DOC 65]; Msg 2600P-W H6402-17, 26 AD to DEADS, 15 Feb 1964 [DOC 66]; Msg ADMSS-WA1 759, ADC to 26 AD, 25 Feb 1964 [DOC 67]; Msg AACORS 02, AAC to TIG USAF, 28 Mar 1964 [DOC 68]; Msg ALDS 38, AAC to USAF, 31 Mar 1964 [DOC 69]; Msg ADODC 1190, ADC to 25 AD, 6 Apr 1964 [DOC 70]; [redacted] Msg ADOOP 1694, ADC to 25 AD, 14 May 1964 [DOC 71].

imposed on F-106's operating from Galena and King Salmon prevented their effective employment. It was the ADC position that the F-102's should be retained in Alaska. If this was not possible, ADC recommended that the commitment for defense of Alaska be assumed by F-4C aircraft under the operational control of NORAD. ADC thinking on this matter apparently coincided, at least in part, with that of the JCS, because at about the same time the JCS directed NORAD to replace the ADC "White Shoes" F-106 contingent with F-4C fighters, effective in July-September 1965. It appeared that "White Shoes" as currently constituted would last about one more year. The ADC planner who had predicted, in September 1963, that "White Shoes" would cover a period of about two years was proving to be an excellent guesser.[35]

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35. Msg ADCCR 1922, ADC to USAF, 8 Jun 1964 [DOC 72]; Msg ADCCS 1996, ADC to USAF, 12 Jun 1964 [DOC 73]; Msg ADLPP 2526, ADC to USAF, 11 Aug 1964 [DOC 74].

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CHAPTER THREE

DEFENSE OF THE PANAMA CANAL

With the air defenses of south Florida and Alaska strengthened by "Southern Tip" and "White Shoes," respectively, attention turned to the Panama Canal. The Canal was within striking distance of Cuba and of any Castroite government that might appear in Central America or northern South America. Defense against air attack on the Canal was provided solely by antiaircraft weapons. No interceptors were assigned to the USAF Southern Command (USAF SOUTHCO), the air component of the unified U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM). The JCS Panama command was concerned about this situation and recommended that interceptors be provided for this area, at least by reflex action, in the event of an air defense emergency.

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In November 1963, USAF gave ADC the responsibility of planning, with USAFSOUTHCO, an expanded air defense of the Canal. The two commands met in Panama on 5-6 December 1963 and hammered out a plan which called for the deployment of varying numbers of F-102A interceptors to Panama, to a maximum of 18 aircraft, in varying states of emergency.[36]

In order that a quick determination might be made of the feasibility of the Panama deployment plan, ADC recommended to CONAD and USAF that the plan be exercised almost immediately, with 18 F-102's to be sent to the Canal Zone on 6 January 1964. Tentative date for the return to the United States was set at 21 January. The 326th FIS at Richards-Gebaur AFB, Missouri, was chosen as the source of the interceptors for Panama. CONAD and USAF approval was forthcoming before Christmas.[37]

The formal order directing the deployment to Panama, Exercise "Gin Tonic," was issued 1 January 1964 and the

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36. [redacted] Msg ADODC 5657, ADC to USAFSOUTHCO, 20 Nov 1963 [DOC 75]; Msg COOP-P X-450, CONAD to ADC, 17 Dec 1963 [DOC 76]; [redacted] Msg ADOOP-WI 5998, ADC to USAF, 19 Dec 1963 [DOC 77].

37. [redacted] Msg ADOOP-WI 5998, ADC to USAF, 19 Dec 1963 [DOC 77]; Msg COOP-O X-458, CONAD to CINCSO, 20 Dec 1963 [DOC 78]; Msg COOP-O X-462, CONAD to ADC, 24 Dec 1963 [DOC 79].

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planned deployment of 18 F-102's from Richards-Gebaur began at 0600 hours (CST) on 6 January. In less than a week, however, the exercise was disrupted by anti-U.S. rioting in the Canal Zone and in the neighboring Republic of Panama. On 13 January USAFSOUTHCO was forced to admit that the local civil unrest had produced such a drain on the Command's resources that it was no longer able to support 18 F-102A aircraft and recommended that 10 be returned to the United States. USAFSOUTHCO contended that the first few days of "Gin Tonic" had provided sufficient information concerning the support of the complete force and that the eight remaining aircraft could adequately test operational concepts. USAFSOUTHCO, at the same time, argued against withdrawal of the entire force on the grounds that it would "deprive us of an air defense capability and psychological capability at a time when nuisance attacks are a decided possibility."[38]

Accordingly, 10 of the 18 F-102A's in Panama were sent back to Richards-Gebaur on 14 January. Four days later,

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38. [redacted], Msg OOP 15152, USAFSO to USCINCSO, 13 Jan 1964 [DOC 80]; [redacted], Msg ADCCR 001, ADC to CONAD, 1 Jan 1964 [DOC 81]; Msg OPL 10003, USAFSO to USCINCSO, 4 Jan 1964 [DOC 82]; [redacted], Msg ADC Task Force (Panama) CCR 15150, ADC Task Force to USAFSO, 13 Jan 1963 [DOC 83].

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18 January, the ADC Task Force announced that "Gin Tonic" would be completed 21 January and the eight remaining interceptors would leave Panama on 22 January. This proved to be erroneous information, however, because the JCS had just decided that the interceptor force currently in Panama should not only remain there, but be augmented by four additional F-102A aircraft. This was intended as a show of force to forestall belligerent action on the part of anti-U.S. elements based in the Republic of Panama. CONAD vigorously protested this JCS decision, explaining that the F-102A was designed as an interceptor and ill-suited for showing the flag to ground-bound dissidents. CONAD added that while short-term diversions of CONAD forces did not seriously degrade CONAD's primary mission, "removal of CONAD forces, already limited, for extended periods of time does adversely affect CONAD's air defense capability."[39] CONAD "strongly requested" that the interceptors presently deployed in the Canal Zone be returned to their home base as quickly as possible.[40]

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39. Msg COOP-O X-i-127, CONAD to JCS, 24 Jan 1964 [DOC 84].

40. Ibid.; [redacted], Msg ADC Task Force CCR 15240; ADC Task Force (Panama) to USAFSO, 18 Jan 1964 [DOC 85]; Msg ADOCP-SDO 214, ADC to 29 AD, 18 Jan 1964 [DOC 86];

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Apparently the CONAD protest was heeded, because not only was the "Gin Tonic" force not augmented, but the eight interceptors deployed to Panama were also returned to Richards-Gebaur on 1 February 1964.[41]

As was true with respect to Alaska, ADC warned affected subordinate commands on 8 May 1964 that current events in the Canal Zone might require another "Gin Tonic" on short notice. This warning was rescinded on 22 May, however, without action.[42]

A second test of the plan for emergency deployment to Panama, Exercise "Cashew Tee," began 6 July 1964. This time only eight F-102A's from the 326th FIS were deployed and only a week was consumed. The interceptors returned home on 13 July. This exercise was not impeded, as "Gin Tonic" had been, by rioting Panamanians. The final report

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[Cont'd] [redacted], Msg ADOCP 216, ADC to ADC Task Force (Panama) 18 Jan 1964 [DOC 87]; [redacted], ADC Task Force CCR 15266, ADC Task Force (Panama), to USAFSO, 18 Jan 1964 [DOC 88]; [redacted] Msg ADC Task Force CCE 15267, ADC Task Force (Panama) to ADC, 19 Jan 1964 [DOC 89]; Msg ADOOP-EI 241, ADC to Air Divs, 21 Jan 1964 [DOC 90].

41. [redacted], Msg ADC Task Force CCR 15430, ADC Task Force (Panama) to USAFSO, 30 Jan 1964 [DOC 91].

42. [redacted], Msg ADODC 1562, ADC to 26, 28 and 29 ADs, 8 May 1964 [DOC 92]; [redacted] Msg ADODC 1777, ADC to 26, 28 and 29 ADs, 22 May 1964 [DOC 93].

[redacted]

of "Cashew Tee" found no fault with the manner in which the interceptors deployed or the way operations were conducted after the interceptor force arrived. All recommendations involved radar surveillance problems in Panama and the inadequacy of communications, operations facilities and maintenance and supply support at Howard AFB. Considerable improvement was needed before the Air Force organization in Panama would be able to support an air defense operation of significant duration.[43]

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43. Msg ADOOP-WI 1860, ADC to AFLC, 1 Jun 1964 [DOC 94]; Msg ADOOP 1935, ADC to CONAD, 8 Jun 1964 [DOC 95]; [redacted] Msg ADC Task Force CCR 15616-14, ADC Task Force (Panama) to CSAFSO, 11 Jul 1964 [DOC 96]; Ltr, ADC, ADOOP-P to ADC, ADODC, "Report of the ADC Task Force for Exercise CASHEW TEE," 17 Jul 1964 [DOC 97].

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CHAPTER FOUR

INTERCEPTOR PLANNING

The ADC interceptor force was a relatively stable organization, in terms of numbers of squadrons, between the end of 1961 and the middle of 1964. The most notable characteristic was a gradual attrition in numbers of aircraft. Attrition, however, was inevitable, since production of interceptor aircraft stopped in 1961. Attrition could be arrested, from time to time, by the transfer of interceptors from overseas units, but the trend was unmistakable.

As to squadrons, the number available to ADC decreased only from 41 to 40 during this period. One squadron was added in July 1962 when the 57th FIS at Keflavik, Iceland, was transferred from Military Air Transport Service (MATS)

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to ADC and converted from F-89J to F-102A aircraft. One squadron was lost in the first half of 1963 in the aftermath to the Cuban crisis. The 76th FIS at Westover AFB, Massachusetts, was inactivated to provide F-102A aircraft for one of the two ANG squadrons that gave up F-104's to equip the 319th FIS at Homestead and the 331st FIS at Webb. The 83rd FIS at Hamilton AFB was inactivated as a means of making up attrition losses of F-101B's in other squadrons. As a result of this action, the 84th FIS, also at Hamilton, had its aircraft complement increased from 18 to 24. The other F-101B's were distributed to understrength units. The numbers and types of squadrons available to ADC are given in Chart 1.

Although the number of squadrons remained virtually the same, slow attrition was noticeable in the numbers of aircraft as the years went along. The extent of attrition is outlined in Charts 2 through 7.

Attrition also forced a continuous reduction in the size of the squadrons which remained in the interceptor force. Squadrons utilizing F-101B and F-106A aircraft were built in "cells" of six aircraft. A "full" squadron was assigned 24 interceptors. But it was also possible to have squadrons of 18, 12 and 6 aircraft. At the end of 1961,

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eight squadrons had 24 F-101B aircraft and three squadrons had 24 F-106A's. During the succeeding 30 months, the number of squadrons controlling 24 F-101B aircraft dropped from eight to three. Only one squadron, the 11th FIS at Duluth, still had 24 F-106A's. And attrition forced continual reprogramming as it became increasingly apparent, for example, that it was going to be impossible to maintain a squadron with 18 aircraft in a particular squadron until the second quarter of Fiscal 1968. It would be necessary to drop the aircraft authorization from 18 to 12 in the first quarter of Fiscal 1967. Dozens of such programming changes were made between the end of 1961 and the middle of 1964. Attrition seemed to be forcing the programmers to fight a losing battle (see Charts 8-11).[44]

Another side effect of attrition was the loss of bases, particularly to the Strategic Air Command. It was

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44. Msg ADOOP-WI 653, ADC to USAF, 7 Mar 1962 [DOC 98]; Weekly Activity Report, ADC, ADLSP-P, 30 Jan 1963 [HRF]; [redacted] Msg ADODC 3052, ADC to USAF, 28 Aug 1963 [DOC 99]; Msg ADODC 5886, ADC to USAF, 11 Dec 1963 [DOC 100]; Msg ADLPP 414, ADC to Air Divs, 6 Feb 1964 [DOC 101]; [redacted] Msg ADODC 1321, ADC to USAF, 16 Apr 1964 [DOC 102]; NORFORN EX CANADA, Msg ADLPP 1705, ADC to Air Divs, 15 May 1964 [DOC 103]; [redacted] Msg ADLPP 1890, ADC to Air Divs, 3 Jun 1964 [DOC 104]; Msg ADLPP 2616, ADC to Air Divs, 20 Aug 1964 [DOC 105].

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general USAF policy to give jurisdiction over bases to the major air command controlling the major activity thereon. Therefore, as the ADC interceptor force contracted, ADC often became a minor partner in base operations and relinquished jurisdiction over the base to another command. This occurred at Grand Forks AFB, North Dakota, as of 1 July 1963, when SAC took control. This completed a SAC sweep the three northern plains bases -- Minot and Grand Forks in North Dakota and Glasgow in Montana -- built in the early fifties primarily for ADC use. Minot and Glasgow had gone to SAC earlier.[45]

Hardly had the mechanics of the Grand Forks transfer been completed, before SAC was requesting the transfer of K.I. Sawyer and Kincheloe Air Force Bases, both located in the upper peninsula of Michigan. SAC presented statistics which proved, at least to SAC satisfaction, that SAC mission activity outweighed ADC operations at both bases. The Plans organization in ADC headquarters prepared a reply which gave ADC concurrence to the transfer of K.I. Sawyer, but objected to the transfer of Kincheloe. This position did not correctly reflect the feeling of the ADC Command Section, however, and

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45. Weekly Activity Report, ADC ADLPP-G, 21 Feb and 17 Apr 1963 [HRF].

the reply, signed by Maj. Gen. Benjamin J. Webster, ADC Chief of Staff, which actually went back to SAC on 20 May 1963 did not concur in the transfer of either base. A month later, 22 June 1963, a personal message from Lt. Gen. Hunter Harris, Jr., SAC Vice Commander, to Lt. Gen. Robert M. Lee, ADC Commander, repeated the request for transfer of both bases. General Lee modified the earlier ADC stand by agreeing to the transfer of K.I. Sawyer, while adding that he "strongly opposed" any change in the status of Kincheloe. The transfer of K.I. Sawyer occured 1 January 1964.[46]

In the face of continuing attrition, it was inevitable that ADC would object to a USAF proposal, broached 16 October 1962, to transfer 22 additional F-101B interceptors to Canada. ADC had previously furnished 66 F-101B's to the Canadians. Since Canada had not yet agreed to accept atomic weapons, ADC contended that transfer of the aircraft to Canada would mean a loss of nuclear capability in continental defense.

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46. Msg DPL 3440, SAC to ADC, 1 May 1963 [DOC 106]; Weekly Activity Report, ADC, ADLPP-G, 9 May and 25 Jun 1963 [HRF]; Msg ADCCR 1877, ADC to SAC, 20 May 1963 [DOC 107]; Msg VC 4826, SAC to ADC, 22 Jun 1963 [DOC 108]; [redacted], Msg ADCCR 2249, ADC to SAC, 27 Jun 1963 [DOC 109]; Msg ADLPP 2571, ADC to 30 AD, 1 Jul 1963 [DOC 110]; Msg DPLCA 5053, SAC to USAF, 2 Jul 1963 [DOC 111]; Msg ADLPP 2582, ADC to SAC, 2 Jul 1963 [DOC 112].

[redacted]

[redacted]

ADC added that procurement of an advanced interceptor, such as the IMI, might make it feasible to provide sufficient first-line interceptors to the Canadians to permit them to maintain five squadrons, but until that time ADC was opposed to the transfer. The matter was dropped at that time, but was brought up again nearly a year later, in September 1963. Again ADC opposed the proposal, although the IMI was not mentioned in the 1963 objections. ADC merely pointed out, for the second time, that Canada still refused to accept nuclear weapons and to transfer interceptors capable of carrying nuclear armament would lessen total NORAD air defense strength. The door was left open for future transfer, however, when ADC explained that it would be amenable to provision of F-101B's for Canada upon the availability of Project Clearwater F-102's as replacements. Clearwater was a Department of Defense plan for the withdrawal of F-102 interceptors from overseas bases. The F-101B transfer plan, however, was again dropped and never, as of October 1964, revived.[47]

The best answer to attrition, of course, was the provision of a new and advanced interceptor to replace at least

47. Msg ADCCS 2808, ADC to USAF, 20 Oct 1962 [DOC 113]; Msg ADODC 5092, ADC to USAF, 25 Sep 1963 [DOC 114].

[redacted]

a part of the aging and diminishing interceptor force. This had once been the F-108, cancelled in September 1959. From that time, ADC was continually busy preparing specifications and justifications for advanced interceptors, generally improved versions of the F-108. This was a frustrating occupation, since the Department of Defense for years apparently refused to approve development of such an aircraft. It was a very closely held secret, meanwhile, that an aircraft offering excellent possibilities as an interceptor was under development at Lockheed. This was the deceptively titled A-11, which entered the development cycle in 1959, the same year the F-108 was cancelled.

For those who did not know about the A-11, or believed it was intended as a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) replacement for the U-2, one heartening aspect of the cancellation of the F-108 was the continued development of the ASG-18 fire control system and the GAR-9 air-to-air missile. This seemed to be a hopeful indication that someday an interceptor would be built to house these air defense sub-systems. Such a marriage was suggested in May 1960 when ADC asked ARDC to look into the possibility of creating an advanced interceptor by equipping the North American A-3J, a Navy aircraft, with the ASG-18/GAR-9. ARDC and

North American conducted some tests, but when theoretical calculations in the autumn of 1960 indicated that the A-3J would have only 37 per cent of the kill probability of the F-108, ADC enthusiasm for this aircraft cooled rapidly.[48]

After this disillusionment, ADC began work, in October 1960, on the specifications for an advanced long-range manned interceptor that involved what ADC called a "quantum jump" in interceptor performance. This vehicle, known as the Long Range Advanced Piloted Interceptor System, or LRAPIS, was to offer a speed of Mach 5 and an altitude of 200 miles. The Wright Air Development Division of ARDC admitted that the LRAPIS was technically feasible, but that the technical difficulties would be great and the cost would be fantastic.[49]

In view of the ARDC comment, ADC, in early 1961, scaled down the LRAPIS to a vehicle capable of speed of Mach 4.5 and an altitude of 90,000 feet. A formal Qualitative

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48. Msg ADLPD-DC 1478, ADC to ARDC, 19 May 1960 [Doc 165 in Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1960]; Weekly Activity Report, ADC, ADLPD-D, 10 May, 16 May, 14 Jul and 1 Sep 1960 [HRF].

49. Weekly Activity Report, ADC, ADLPD-D, 11 Oct, 31 Oct, 1 Dec and 8 Dec 1960 [HRF]; Aerospace Defense Systems Summary, ADC, Feb 1961 [HRF].

Operational Requirement (QOR) on this subject was submitted to USAF in April 1961, but generated no enthusiasm there. It had neither been approved nor disapproved by the end of 1961. Meanwhile, in the summer of 1961, ADC was invited to participate in planning a new, all-weather, joint-service 2.5 Mach aircraft called TFX. But ADC demurred on the ground that a Mach 2.5 interceptor would be too slow to counter the post-1965 threat. Also, ADC felt it needed an aircraft with a radius of action of at least 800 miles. In August 1961 USAF entered the discussion by presenting the Department of Defense with a proposal to provide 25 squadrons of long-range interceptors to ADC, beginning in Fiscal 1967. DOD disapproved the USAF request, but USAF hoped approval would come later, with funds to be made available in the budget for Fiscal 1963. USAF had in mind an aircraft that offered performance somewhere between that of the F-108 and LRAPIS.[50]

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50. [redacted], Ltr, ADC to USAF, "Qualitative Operational Requirement for a Long Range Advanced Piloted Interceptor System (LRAPIS)," 11 Apr 1961 [Doc 413 in Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1961]; Weekly Activity Report, ADC, ADLPD-D, 15 Sep, 29 Sep, 26 Oct and 14 Dec 1961 and 17 Jan 1962 [HRF]; Msg AFORQ-AD 78657, USAF to ADC, 15 Jun 1961 [Doc 446a in Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1961]; Msg AFSSA-AS-4 99328, USAF to AFSC, 5 Sep 1961 [Doc 447 in Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1961]; Msg AFORQ-TA 61182, USAF to AFSC, 12 Sep 1961 [Doc 448 in Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1961]; Msg ADCC3 1931, ADC to USAF, 13 Sep 1961 [Doc 449 in Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1961];

But no funds were requested for what had come to be known as the Improved Manned Interceptor (IMI) in the budget for Fiscal 1963. In something of an afterthought to his testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on 22 January 1962, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara said that "later on, if a new interceptor is required, we could consider the TFX fighter for that role."[51] The TFX, of course, was not what ADC and USAF wanted.

Even so, USAF indicated to ADC in January 1962 that DOD recognized the need to modernize the interceptor fleet after 1965. At the same time, USAF did not believe it was the opportune moment to push LRAPIS. Nothing much happened, however, as the months stretched into years. Hopes were rekindled when Secretary McNamara visited ADC/NORAD on 14 August 1962 and appeared to listen sympathetically to briefings which detailed the requirement for the IMI. He asked for a further briefing on the subject in Washington on 5 September.

[Cont'd] Msg AFORQ 63810, USAF to ADC, 21 Sep 1961 [Doc 450 in Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1961]; USAF, Current States Report, Nov 1961, p. III-1 [Doc 441 in Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1961]; and Dec 1961, p. III-1 [Doc 265 in Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1961].

51. Senate Hearings on Military Procurement Authorization for Fiscal 1963, Senate Committee on Armed Services, 22 Jan 1962, p. 78.

Near the end of the year, the Secretary of Defense responded to a question from President Kennedy by outlining in a memo the performance data on five aircraft being considered as advanced interceptors -- F-4, A-3J, TFX, Eagle/Aerie and IMI. This action gave rise to rumors that a decision was about to be made.[52] The rumors were wrong.

Instead, the Secretary of Defense asked USAF, in January 1963, to make a comprehensive study of the air defense system, war gaming the same five possible interceptors mentioned in the memo to the President. This led to the Continental Air Defense Study (CADS) of January-May 1963.[53] To the House Armed Services Committee, the Secretary, in testimony given 31 January 1963, outlined the interceptor situation this way:[54]

> Whether or not the Soviet Union actually deploys a new long-range bomber, we intend to make a thorough study of the entire problem of modernizing our manned interceptor force and we hope that next

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52. Weekly Activity Report, ADC, ADLPD-D, 17 Jan and 10 May 1962; ADLSP-A, 18 Jun, 21 Aug, 17 Sep and 12 Nov 1962 and 14 Jan 1963 [HRF]; Memo, ADLSP, ADC to ADC Staff Sections, "Programmed Action Directives," 28 Nov 1962 [DOC 115].

53. Weekly Activity Report, ADC, ADLSP-A, 18 Jan 1963 [HRF].

54. House Hearings on the Department of Defense Budget for Fiscal 1964, House Armed Services Committee, 31 Jan 1963, p. 323.

year we will be in a better position to make some definite recommendations on this subject. I do not believe, in the light of presently available intelligence and the wide range of options open to us, that the situation requires us to make a decision now. There are a number of aircraft already in production, under development, or programmed which could be adapted to the interceptor role with only modest additional outlays for development costs.

After detailed consideration of cost, availability, expected operational life and extensive war gaming of all five options, the CADS group, in its report of May 1963, reached the "tentative" conclusion that the IMI was the preferred option and made the "tentative" recommendation that 12 squadrons of IMI's be procured. Unfortunately, a similar AFSC effort, "Survivable and Effective Air Breathing Defense Study" (SEADS), performed under contract by North American Aviation and General Dynamics, reached the conclusion that a scaled-up version of the TFX offered the best possibilities as an advanced manned interceptor. ADC pointed out the obvious disadvantages of the concurrent existence of two Air Force studies which reached divergent conclusions and added that ADC approved the CADS report, but definitely did not agree with the SEADS conclusions.[55]

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55. Msg ADLDC 1569, ADC to ASD, 17 Apr 1963 [DOC 116];

No immediate action was taken by the Secretary of Defense with respect to the IMI or any other advanced manned interceptor and on 4 February 1964, before a joint session of the Senate Committees on Appropriations and Armed Services, he revealed why. In the first place, the Secretary had read an entirely different set of conclusions into the CADS report. In the second place, he did not think it was yet possible to assess with any degree of accuracy the nature of the future manned bomber threat. His reasoning went as follows:[56]

> I informed the committee last year that whether or not the Soviet Union actually deployed a new long-range bomber we intended to make a thorough study of the entire problem of modernizing our manned interceptor force. Such a study was completed by the Air Force last year.
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> There are actually a number of aircraft already in production, under development, or in operation which could be adapted to the interceptor role, including the F-4, the A-5, the F-111 (TFX), and the

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[Cont'd] Msg ADLDC 2826, ADC to USAF, 29 Jul 1963 [DOC 117]; Msg ADLDC 2987, ADC to USAF, 19 Aug 1963 [DOC 118]; Weekly Activity Report, ADC, ADLPW-A, 9 Aug 1963 [HRF].

56. Joint Senate Hearings on the Department of Defense Appropriations for Fiscal 1965, Senate Committee on Appropriations and Armed Services, Part I, 4 Feb 1964, pp. 102-03.

[redacted]

C-135B, the last serving as an air-to-air missile platform. Still another possibility would be a completely new interceptor (IMI) based upon some of the latest work done on airframes and engines. One of the surprising conclusions of the Air Force study is that any one of these five systems would, for the same total program cost, provide roughly comparable defenses against a fairly wide range of possible bomber threats.

Thus, the selection of an advanced interceptor would most likely have to be based on other considerations; for example, availability, the degree of confidence in systems characteristics and in the cost estimates, vulnerability to no-warning or intensive defense suppression attacks, dependence on ground control, usefulness in a TAC role, effectiveness against a supersonic bomber threat, etc. Each of the five alternative systems has its own particular strengths and weaknesses in terms of these 'secondary' criteria. Selection of any one of these systems now would involve some kind of uncertainty.

Nevertheless, we do have a number of good choices for a 'follow-on' interceptor and we will continue to have these choices for some time. But until we can better discern the character of the future manned bomber threat and determine the proper balance among the three basic elements of our defensive posture -- that is, defense against manned bombers, defense against ICBM's and submarine launched missiles, and civil defense -- it would be premature to make a choice. Meanwhile we are proceeding with the production and improvement of the F-4, the development of the F-111, and development of a number of sub-systems which might be needed by a new interceptor.

[redacted]

None of this testimony gave any hint of the surprise of 29 February 1964 -- just 25 days later -- when President Lyndon B. Johnson announced development of the A-11, an aircraft offering a sustained speed of 2,000 miles an hour and capable of altitudes above 70,000 feet. The President also said the A-11 was undergoing tests to determine its capability as an interceptor. On 5 March, Secretary McNamara told a press conference flatly that the A-11 was an interceptor and specifically the IMI for which the Air Force had been asking.[57]

So great was the surprise, since the general outlines of current developments were usually, regardless of classification, known to the press, that a spate of scoffing articles appeared following the announcements of the President and Secretary of Defense. For example, Ordnance contended that "the A-11 is no more of an interceptor than the RB-70 is a strategic bomber, official pronouncements to the contrary notwithstanding."[58] The Saturday Evening Post hinted darkly that the A-11 was revealed as an interceptor merely to take the steam out of the drive for the IMI. Even though the Joint Chiefs of Staff were unanimously in favor of the IMI,

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57. "President's Press Conference," Washington Star, 1 Mar 1964; "A-11 is What the AF Asked," Laurence Barrett, New York Herald Tribune, 6 Mar 1964.

58. Ordnance, May/Jun 1964.

[redacted]

according to the Post, Secretary McNamara was not convinced an advanced interceptor would ever be needed, hence the A-11 smokescreen.[59]

Despite the insistence of critics that the A-11 was too frail to carry the fire control system and armament required of an interceptor, the YF-12A (Air Force designation for the A-11) revealed to the public on 30 September 1964 was equipped with the ASG-18 fire control system and AIM-47A (GAR-9) originally developed for the F-108 and continued in development following the demise of the F-108. While Republican campaigners remained unconvinced (Rep. Melvin Laird of Wisconsin, chairman of the Republican platform committee, called it the "all-purpose political aircraft"), the general consensus was that if the YF-12A was not the IMI it was likely to be a highly satisfactory substitute for it. Time, for example, characterized the YF-12A as "a real interceptor, lean and mean."[60]

The public showing of 30 September 1964 verified the fact that an interceptor of tremendously improved performance was available. As of early October, however, no production contracts had been written and the Department of Defense had

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59. "The Great A-11 Deception," James Atwater, Saturday Evening Post, 2 May 1964.

60. Time, 9 Oct 1964; Colorado Springs Free Press, 1 Oct 1964; Chicago Tribune, 2 Oct 1964.

[redacted]

not decided whether such contracts would be written. ADC requirements were those listed in the recommendations of the CADS study -- 12 squadrons of 12 aircraft each.[61]

Force programming, as practiced by ADC from 1962 to 1964, called generally for a gradual decline in the interceptor force as the result of aircraft attrition. The size of the individual squadrons also declined for the same reason. The program of 15 March 1962, alone, was an exception, in that it foresaw 41 squadrons at the end of Fiscal 1966, the same number active at the time the program was written. The decline, according to the programmers, would begin in Fiscal 1967. By the end of that year, according to the program of 24 January 1963, the interceptor force would be down to 39 squadrons. The program of 1 July 1963, which looked ahead to the end of Fiscal 1968, foresaw a force of 37 squadrons.[62]

A new dimension was added to interceptor force programming in May 1964 when the Department of Defense, in

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61. Colorado Springs Free Press, 1 Oct 1964; Command Briefing, ADC, 5 Oct 1964, Col. A.K. McDonald, ADLPW.

62. ADCM 27-2, Vol II, 15 Mar 1962 [HRF]; ADCM 27-2, Vol II, 15 Mar 1962, as amended by Chg H, 24 Jan 1963 [HRF]; ADCM 27-2, Vol II, 15 Apr 1963, as amended by Chg D, 1 Jul 1963 [HRF].

getting ready for preparation of the defense budget for Fiscal 1966, produced a Tentative Force Guidance (TFG) document that called for reduction of the interceptor force to 21 squadrons by the end of Fiscal 1967 and specified where each of the squadrons should be located. The then current ADC programming guide called for a force approximately double that size at the end of Fiscal 1967. ADC, in a reply of 11 June 1964, did not argue the size of the force proposed in the TFG, but recommended a considerable change in deployment on the grounds that the ADC-proposed deployment would (1) provide an improved northern defense posture, manned by regular ADC units (2) provide a better organizational base for the IMI and (3) reduce the number of moves and equipage changes necessary to establish the Secretary of Defense's force in an optimum defensive posture.[63]

ADC recommended that the TFG force, if formally approved, consist of eight F-101B squadrons, 11 F-106A squadrons and two F-104A squadrons deployed as follows:[64]

F-101B	F-106A	F-104A
Hamilton	George	Homestead
Kingsley	McChord	Charleston

63. [redacted] Msg ADCCR 1973, ADC to USAF, 11 Jun 1964 [DOC 119].

64. Ibid.

[redacted]

[redacted]

F-101B	F-106A	F-104A
Glasgow	Castle	
K.I. Sawyer	Paine	
Oxnard	Minot	
Griffiss	Kincheloe	
Otis	Loring	
Suffolk	Richards-Gebaur	
	Langley	
	Dover	
	Selfridge	

The combat capability of the currently programmed force as opposed to that of the TFG force was then extensively war-gamed by ADC. In either type of warning situation (tactical or strategic) or against either type of attack (counterforce -- the strategic retaliatory complex -- or countervalue -- population and industrial centers), the games showed that the programmed force wreaked considerably more havoc among the attackers than did the TFG force. ADC then recommended, in July 1964, that the programmed force be retained in preference to the TFG force. And ADC had significant allies in this position. On 7 October 1964 the Joint Chiefs of Staff (with the Army Chief of Staff absent) reaffirmed an earlier decision that the interceptor force should not be reduced to TFG levels unless the IMI was made available.[65]

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65. Ltr, ADC to USAF, "Secretary of Defense Force Guidance Memorandum," 6 Jul 1964 [DOC 119A]; Command Briefing, ADC, 8 Oct 1964, Col. C.E. Hammett, ADLDC.

[redacted]

Meanwhile, since TFG was a proposal and not a directive, ADC force programming continued in the even tenor of its ways. The ADC program of 3 July 1964 forecast a gradual decline in interceptor strength until 37 squadrons would remain at the end of Fiscal 1969. This was the same number predicted for the end of Fiscal 1968, but there was a difference. The program for the end of Fiscal 1968 called for one F-101B squadron of 24 aircraft and three F-106A squadrons of 12 aircraft. The succeeding program did not include the squadron of 24 F-101B's and the number of 12-aircraft F-106A squadrons had increased to four. The most recent program (as of October 1964), dated 18 September 1964, called for an interceptor force of 36 squadrons at the end of Fiscal 1969 (see Charts 8-11).[66]

Attrition occurred in many forms, but the most unusual form it took during 1962-64 was an indirect result of Project Clearwater, a proposal to reduce the flow of U.S. gold overseas by returning overseas F-102A squadrons to the United States. One Clearwater transfer was to concern ADC. It also involved removing an ADC squadron from Davis-Monthan AFB,

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66. ADCM 27-2, Vol II, 15 Apr 1963, as amended by Chg D, 1 Jul 1963 [HRF]; ADC Program Document 64-69, 15 Apr 1964, as amended by Chg C, 3 Jul 1964 and Chg F, 18 Sep 1964 [HRF].

[redacted]

[redacted]

Arizona, in order to permit a greater concentration of SAC and TAC forces there. The plan as developed in August 1963 was for ADC to transfer the 15th FIS at Davis-Monthan to TAC, with ADC retaining the squadron's F-101B aircraft for distribution among other F-101B units within the command. ADC would then receive the 16th FIS (F-102A aircraft) from Naha AFB, Okinawa, and would base it at Edwards AFB, California. It was anticipated that the transfer would take place in December 1964.[67]

The Secretary of Defense gave his approval to this transfer on 19 November 1963, but by this time there were reasons why the transfer as planned in August appeared impractical. The $1.2 millions for the construction of required facilities at Edwards was not to be available from the Fiscal 1964 funds and would have to wait for Fiscal 1965 appropriations. This would mean that the squadron would have to operate under highly austere conditions for the first 12 to 15 months after it arrived at Edwards. Further, it appeared that the TAC F-4C wing planned for Davis-Monthan would be placed elsewhere. Therefore, it had become practical to move the Naha squadron to Davis-Monthan and USAF so

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67. [redacted] Msg ADCCS 2967, ADC to USAF, 14 Aug 1963 [DOC 120]; Msg ADIRP 2978, ADC to 28 AD, 16 Aug 1963 [DOC 121].

[redacted]

recommended in December 1963. ADC, however, preferred Edwards as the permanent location of the repatriated 16th FIS, but agreed to base the squadron at Davis-Monthan until the Edwards construction was completed. But USAF would not be swayed and announced that the 16th FIS would definitely move to Davis-Monthan. The funds for construction at Edwards had been removed from the Military Construction program for Fiscal 1965.[68]

Another aspect of Project Clearwater was the return of 42 F-102A's from Spain and possibly 20 from Itazuke AFB, Japan. These were not returned in the form of complete squadrons, however, and were to be distributed piecemeal among ADC and ANG units. The movement from Europe occurred between 15 April and 1 July 1964. The movement from Japan was contingent on the sale of the aircraft to the Japanese government.[69]

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68. [redacted] Msg ADOOP-WI 5995, ADC to NORAD, 19 Dec 1963 [DOC 122]; [redacted] Msg ADODC 6007, ADC to USAF, 19 Dec 1963 [DOC 123]; [redacted] Msg ADODC 6123, ADC to 28 AD, 31 Dec 1963 [DOC 124]; [redacted] Msg ADOOP-W 49, ADC to 28 AD, 7 Jan 1964 [DOC 125]; [redacted] Msg ADOOP-W 150, ADC to 28 AD, 14 Jan 1964 [DOC 126].

69. [redacted] Msg ADMLP 433, ADC to USAF Central Coordinating Staff-Canada (Ottawa), 7 Feb 1964 [DOC 127]; [redacted] Msg ADLPP 1450, ADC to USAF, 29 Apr 1964 [DOC 128].

[redacted]

[redacted]

As 1964 wore along, other small changes were made in the plan for reception of the 16th FIS from Okinawa. In April it was decided that eight F-102A's from Perrin AFB, Texas, would stand alert at Davis-Monthan between the time the 15th FIS was inactivated and the 16th FIS arrived. The 16th was obligated to remain operationally ready at Naha until 15 December 1964. In June, ADC recommended that the designation of 15th FIS remain at Davis-Monthan upon inactivation of the F-101B unit, since TAC did not intend to use that designation. Inactivation of the 16th, with transfer of aircraft to the 15th, would save money in that supply accounts would not have to be changed and a great amount of re-stencilling of property would not be required. USAF agreed.[70]

But then came August and the Tonkin Gulf episode in which North Vietnamese torpedo boats attacked U.S. destroyers and the U.S. retaliated by bombing shore installations along the coast of North Vietnam. This action raised the possibility that Communist China might respond by bombing South Vietnam. A detachment of the 16th FIS moved into South

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70. Msg ADMSS 1175, ADC to SAAMA, 3 Apr 1964 [DOC 129]; Msg ADPDP 1941, ADC to USAF, 9 Jun 1964 [DOC 130]; Msg ADMLP 2427, ADC to AFLC, 30 Jul 1964 [DOC 131].

[redacted]

Vietnam to provide added air defense capability. Under the circumstances, it did not appear wise to remove this group of F-102A's from southeast Asia. As a result, ADC was directed to proceed with the simple inactivation of the 15th FIS. No substitute aircraft were to be provided. NORAD vigorously protested this action to the JCS on 1 September 1964 and ADC made a similar protest to USAF the following day. As of early October USAF had made no move to rescind the order for inactivation and by 6 October the 15th FIS had been reduced to a point where it was considered only marginally combat ready (C-3) because it retained only 13 of the 18 F-101B interceptors normally assigned. It was estimated that the squadron would lose all combat capability by 1 November if the inactivation order was not soon rescinded. Loss of the 15th would reduce the ADC interceptor force to 39 squadrons.[71]

Msg ADCCS 2708, ADC to USAF, 27 Aug 1964 [DOC 132]; Msg ADCCR 2760, ADC to USAF, 1 Sep 1964 [DOC 133]; Msg ADLPP 2773, ADC to 28 AD, 2 Sep 1964 [DOC 134]; Msg ADLPP 3020, ADC to USAF, 23 Sep 1964 [DOC 135]; Msg ADMSS-EM 3039, ADC to SAAMA, 25 Sep 1964 [DOC 136]; [redacted] APEX STATREP, ADC, 6 Oct 1964 [HRF].

[redacted]

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CHART 1

ADC INTERCEPTOR SQUADRONS BY TYPE

31 December 1961 - 30 June 1964

Type Acft	31 Dec 1961	30 Jun 1962	31 Dec 1962	30 Jun 1963	31 Dec 1963	30 Jun 1964
F-101B	17	17	17	16	16	16
F-106A	14	14	14	13	13	13
F-102A	10	10	11	9	9	9
F-104A	0	0	0	2	2	2
Total	41	41	42	40	40	40

SOURCE: RCS: 1AF-V14, ADC, 28 Dec 1961, 27 Jun 1962, 26 Dec 1962 and 26 Jun 1963; [redacted] APEX Status Report, ADC, 31 Dec 1963 and 30 Jun 1964.

[redacted]

CHART 2

ADC TACTICAL AIRCRAFT BY TYPE

Type Acft	31 Dec 1961	30 Jun 1962	31 Dec 1962	30 Jun 1963	31 Dec 1963	30 Jun 1964
F-101B	332	289	285	261	247	250
F-106A	247	251	241	227	216	211
F-102A	226	231	228	176	194	191
F-104A	0	0	0	47	47	36
Total	805	771	754	711	704	688

SOURCES: RCS: 1AF-V14, ADC, 28 Dec 1961, 27 Jun 1962, 26 Dec 1962 and 26 Jun 1963; [redacted] APEX Status Report, ADC, 31 Dec 1963 and 30 Jun 1964.

[redacted]

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CHART 3

FIGHTER INTERCEPTOR FORCE

June 1962

Sqdn	Base	Base Asgmt	Type Acft	Aircraft Possessed	Aircraft Combat Ready	Crews Formed	Crews Combat Ready
2	Suffolk	ADC	F-101B	19	14	24	22
5	Minot	ADC	F-106A	15	14	25	22
11	Duluth	ADC	F-106A	23	16	30	27
13	Glasgow	SAC	F-101B	16	14	22	22
15	Davis-Monthan	SAC	F-101B	17	13	24	22
18	Grand Forks	ADC	F-101B	16	12	23	23
27	Loring	SAC	F-106A	22	18	29	27
29	Malmstrom	SAC	F-101B	16	10	26	22
48	Langley	TAC	F-106A	17	13	24	21
49	Griffiss	AFLC	F-101B	23	19	29	29
59	Goose Bay	ADC	F-102A	31	28	44	42
60	Otis	ADC	F-101B	16	13	25	25
62	K.I. Sawyer	ADC	F-101B	15	11	26	26
64	Paine	ADC	F-102A	21	19	34	27
71	Selfridge	ADC	F-106A	16	13	21	21
75	Dow	SAC	F-101B	16	15	18	17
76	Westover	SAC	F-102A	20	13	32	30
82	Travis	MATS	F-102A	21	20	36	30
83	Hamilton	ADC	F-101B	16	10	21	20
84	Hamilton	ADC	F-101B	18	11	20	18
87	Lockbourne	SAC	F-101B	18	15	24	24
94	Selfridge	ADC	F-106A	17	16	18	18
95	Andrews	Hq COM	F-106A	15	11	18	16
98	Dover	MATS	F-101B	16	13	23	23

CHART 3 (Cont'd)

Sqdn	Base	Base Asgmt	Type Acft	Aircraft		Crews	
				Possessed	Combat Ready	Formed	Combat Ready
318	McChord	ADC	F-106A	21	16	34	27
319	Bunker Hill	SAC	F-106A	15	11	23	22
322	Kingsley	ADC	F-101B	16	13	21	21
325	Truax	ADC	F-102A	22	19	40	34
326	Richards-Gebaur	ADC	F-102A	23	19	34	31
329	George	TAC	F-106A	17	11	27	25
331	Webb	ATC	F-102A	23	19	35	32
332	Thule	ADC	F-102A	14	12	19	19
437	Oxnard	ADC	F-101B	18	17	29	29
438	Kincheloe	ADC	F-106A	18	14	22	18
444	Charleston	MATS	F-101B	16	13	19	19
445	Wurtsmith	SAC	F-101B	17	15	18	18
456	Castle	SAC	F-106A	19	16	27	27
460	Portland	ADC	F-102A	23	20	34	34
482	Seymour Johnson	TAC	F-102A	19	15	27	27
482	Homestead	SAC	F-102A	4	4	6	6
498	Spokane	ADC	F-106A	18	16	22	21
539	McGuire	MATS	F-106A	18	11	27	26

SOURCE: RCS: 1AF-V14, 27 June 1962

CHART 4

FIGHTER INTERCEPTOR FORCE

December 1962

Sqdn	Base	Base Asgmt	Type Acft	Aircraft		Crews	
				Possessed	Combat Ready	Formed	Combat Ready
2	Suffolk	ADC	F-101B	16	14	22	20
5	Minot	ADC	F-106A	17	13	22	22
11	Duluth	ADC	F-106A	20	15	29	29
13	Glasgow	SAC	F-101B	16	13	22	21
15	Davis-Monthan	SAC	F-101B	17	15	24	23
18	Grand Forks	ADC	F-101B	16	12	23	19
27	Loring	SAC	F-106A	21	15	24	24
29	Malmstrom	SAC	F-101B	16	12	21	20
48	Langley	TAC	F-106A	20	13	24	23
49	Griffiss	AFLC	F-101B	21	19	26	26
57	Keflavik	Navy	F-102A	14	11	21	17
59	Goose Bay	ADC	F-102A	29	24	48	44
60	Otis	ADC	F-101B	17	14	24	24
62	K.I. Sawyer	ADC	F-101B	17	15	20	19
64	Paine	ADC	F-102A	19	17	32	27
71	Selfridge	ADC	F-106A	16	13	21	21
75	Dow	SAC	F-101B	16	16	18	18
76	Westover	SAC	F-102A	20	18	30	27
82	Travis	MATS	F-102A	20	17	36	33
83	Hamilton	ADC	F-101B	16	13	25	22
84	Hamilton	ADC	F-101B	16	13	25	23
87	Lockbourne	SAC	F-101B	17	11	21	20
94	Selfridge	ADC	F-106A	16	16	24	24
95	Andrews	Hq COM	F-106A	16	12	23	21

CHART 4 (Continued)

Sqdn	Base	Base Asgmt	Type Acft	Aircraft Possessed	Aircraft Combat Ready	Crews Formed	Crews Combat Ready
98	Dover	MATS	F-101B	17	16	20	20
318	McChord	ADC	F-106A	17	13	26	24
319	Bunker Hill	SAC	F-106A	16	11	24	23
322	Kingsley	ADC	F-101B	19	18	22	22
325	Truax	ADC	F-102A	20	19	32	28
326	Richards-Gebaur	ADC	F-102A	2	-	12	9
326	Homestead	SAC	F-102A	20	18	24	24
329	George	TAC	F-106A	16	11	24	23
331	Webb	ATC	F-102A	22	18	34	34
332	Thule	ADC	F-102A	13	11	22	21
437	Oxnard	ADC	F-101B	17	16	26	25
438	Kincheloe	ADC	F-106A	16	13	21	21
444	Charleston	MATS	F-101B	16	15	20	20
445	Wurtsmith	SAC	F-101B	15	10	16	16
456	Castle	SAC	F-106A	18	14	29	29
460	Portland	ADC	F-102A	25	21	37	34
482	Seymour Johnson	TAC	F-102A	24	19	33	32
498	Spokane	ADC	F-106A	18	12	24	23
539	McGuire	MATS	F-106A	14	10	23	20

SOURCE: RCS: 1AF-V14, 26 December 1962

CHART 5

FIGHTER INTERCEPTOR FORCE

June 1963

Sqdn	Base	Base Asgmt	Type Acft	Aircraft		Crews	
				Possessed	Combat Ready	Formed	Combat Ready
2	Suffolk	ADC	F-101B	17	14	16	12
5	Minot	ADC	F-106A	21	17	21	21
11	Duluth	ADC	F-106A	23	18	31	27
13	Glasgow	SAC	F-101B	16	15	18	18
15	Davis-Monthan	SAC	F-101B	16	13	18	18
18	Grand Forks	ADC	F-101B	16	14	21	19
27	Loring	SAC	F-106A	20	17	24	24
29	Malmstrom	SAC	F-101B	16	13	22	20
48	Langley	TAC	F-106A	19	13	25	23
49	Griffiss	AFLC	F-101B	20	17	25	18
57	Keflavik	Navy	F-102A	14	13	24	21
59	Goose Bay	ADC	F-102A	33	29	42	39
60	Otis	ADC	F-101B	17	15	24	23
62	K.I. Sawyer	ADC	F-101B	17	15	21	20
64	Paine	ADC	F-102A	24	20	39	38
71	Selfridge	ADC	F-106A	5	3	23	21
75	Dow	SAC	F-101B	16	15	18	18
82	Travis	MATS	F-102A	25	20	36	35
84	Hamilton	ADC	F-101B	23	19	27	27
87	Lockbourne	SAC	F-101B	16	13	21	21
94	Selfridge	ADC	F-106A	3	3	23	23
95	Andrews	Hq COM	F-106A	19	15	15	14
98	Suffolk	ADC	F-101B	16	13	13	13

CHART 5 (Continued)

Sqdn	Base	Base Asgmt	Type Acft	Aircraft Possessed	Aircraft Combat Ready	Crews Formed	Crews Combat Ready
318	McChord	ADC	F-106A	21	13	25	25
319	Homestead	SAC	F-104A	29	22	33	31
322	Kingsley	ADC	F-101B	17	8	26	26
325	Truax	ADC	F-102A	23	20	33	26
326	Richards-Gebaur	ADC	F-102A	8	7	37	35
329	George	TAC	F-106A	20	15	28	26
331	Webb	ATC	F-104A	18	8	20	7
332	Thule	ADC	F-102A	7	6	13	13
437	Oxnard	ADC	F-101B	4	2	28	25
438	Kincheloe	ADC	F-106A	19	14	22	22
444	Charleston	MATS	F-101B	17	15	22	18
445	Wurtsmith	SAC	F-101B	17	15	20	18
456	Castle	SAC	F-106A	19	14	19	19
460	Portland	ADC	F-102A	25	23	34	34
482	Seymour Johnson	TAC	F-102A	11	10	28	27
482	Key West	Navy	F-102A	6	6	10	10
438	McChord	ADC	F-106A	20	7	19	17
539	McGuire	MATS	F-106A	18	13	25	25

SOURCE: RCS: 1AF-V14, 26 June 1963

CHART 6

FIGHTER INTERCEPTOR FORCE

December 1963

Sqdn	Base	Base Asgmt	Type Acft	Aircraft Possessed	Aircraft Combat Ready	Crews Formed	Crews Combat Ready
2	Suffolk	ADC	F-101B	14	11	21	16
5	Minot	SAC	F-106	9	5	20	19
11	Duluth	ADC	F-106	16	13	27	20
13	Glasgow	SAC	F-101B	15	13	20	20
15	Davis-Monthan	SAC	F-101B	14	12	15	15
	Williams	-	-	3	3	3	3
18	Grand Forks	ADC	F-101B	15	13	18	18
27	Loring	SAC	F-106	19	13	21	20
29	Malmstrom	SAC	F-101B	14	12	22	22
48	Langley	TAC	F-106	12	11	24	23
49	Griffiss	AFLC	F-101B	19	16	25	25
57	Keflavik	ADC	F-102	14	9	18	18
59	Goose Bay	SAC	F-102	27	24	33	33
	Harmon	-	-	5	5	4	4
60	Otis	ADC	F-101B	17	15	18	18
62	K.I. Sawyer	ADC	F-101B	15	11	22	21
64	Paine	ADC	F-102	22	17	35	35
71	Selfridge	ADC	F-106	20	18	20	18
75	Dow	SAC	F-101B	2	2	20	19
82	Travis	MATS	F-102	14	12	39	37
84	Hamilton	ADC	F-101B	21	18	28	25
87	Lockbourne	SAC	F-101B	11	3	18	18
94	Selfridge	ADC	F-106	20	13	21	20
95	Dover	MATS	F-106	18	12	18	14
98	Suffolk	ADC	F-101B	14	9	19	18

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CHART 6 (Continued)

Sqdn	Base	Base Asgmt	Type Acft	Aircraft Possessed	Aircraft Combat Ready	Crews Formed	Crews Combat Ready
318	McChord	ADC	F-106	16	9	16	15
319	Homestead	SAC	F-104	28	25	28	27
322	Kingsley	ADC	F-101B	20	19	26	26
325	Truax	ADC	F-102	27	22	39	38
326	Richards-Gebaur	ADC	F-102	26	22	33	31
329	George	TAC	F-106	16	11	19	17
331	Webb	ATC	F-104	19	13	24	24
332	Thule	ADC	F-102	7	6	7	7
437	Oxnard	ADC	F-101B	21	20	27	23
438	Kincheloe	ADC	F-106	20	18	22	19
444	Charleston	MATS	F-101B	16	15	22	21
445	Wurtsmith	SAC	F-101B	16	15	20	19
456	Castle	SAC	F-106	18	13	22	20
460	Portland	ADC	F-102	26	21	36	36
482	Seymour Johnson	TAC	F-102A	19	18	28	28
	Key West	-	-	7	6	9	9
498	McChord	ADC	F-106A	15	9	14	13
539	McGuire	MATS	F-106	17	9	14	14

SOURCE: RCS: 1AF-V14, 27 November 1963

CHART 7

FIGHTER INTERCEPTOR FORCE

30 June 1964

Sqdn	Base	Base Asgmt	Type Acft	Aircraft		Crews	
				Possessed	Combat Ready	Formed	Combat Ready
64	Paine	ADC	F-102	23	19	31	31
82	Travis	MATS	F-102	22	20	33	33
84	Hamilton	ADC	F-101B	20	14	28	27
318	McChord	ADC	F-106	14	12	21	20
322	Kingsley	ADC	F-101B	23	19	29	27
460	Portland	ADC	F-102A	24	20	33	31
498	McChord	ADC	F-106	14	10	26	18
2	Suffolk	ADC	F-101	17	13	23	19
27	Loring	SAC	F-106	12	10	19	18
48	Langley	TAC	F-106	16	12	18	17
49	Griffiss	AFLC	F-101	18	17	29	27
57	Keflavik	ADC	F-102	11	9	18	18
59	Goose	SAC	F-102	27	20	41	36
	Harmon	-	-	4	4	0	5
60	Otis	ADC	F-101B	15	14	20	14
71	Selfridge	ADC	F-106	18	12	23	17
75	Dow	SAC	F-101B	16	14	21	20
87	Lockbourne	SAC	F-101B	17	16	18	18
94	Selfridge	ADC	F-106	17	14	22	17
95	Dover	MATS	F-106	16	10	23	20
98	Suffolk	ADC	F-101B	14	14	21	17

CHART 7 (Continued)

Sqdn	Base	Base Asgmt	Type Acft	Aircraft Possessed	Aircraft Combat Ready	Crews Formed	Crews Combat Ready
319	Homestead	SAC	F-104	18	16	31	27
332	Thule	ADC	F-102	7	5	7	7
444	Charleston	MATS	F-101	14	11	24	20
445	Wurtsmith	SAC	F-101	16	16	19	17
482	Seymour Johnson	TAC	F-102	19	18	33	24
	Key West	-	-	6	6	-	3
539	McGuire	MATS	F-106	18	13	22	21
15	Davis-Monthan	SAC	F-101	12	10	17	15
	Williams	-	-	2	2	-	2
329	George	TAC	F-106	14	11	20	14
	Edwards	-	-	5	5	-	5
437	Oxnard	ADC	F-101	14	13	24	24
456	Castle	SAC	F-106	17	13	23	23
5	Minot	SAC	F-106	16	13	20	20
13	Glasgow	SAC	F-101B	12	9	19	15
	Tinker	-	-	4	4	-	4
29	Malmstrom	SAC	F-101B	6	5	23	20
326	Richards-Gebaur	ADC	F-102	24	19	32	31
331	Webb	ATC	F-104	14	12	24	21
	Homestead	-	-	4	4	-	3
11	Duluth	ADC	F-106	19	16	26	25
18	Grand Forks	SAC	F-101B	14	13	21	21
62	K.I. Sawyer	SAC	F-101B	16	13	22	18
325	Truax	ADC	F-102A	24	20	32	30
438	Kincheloe	ADC	F-106	15	13	22	22

SOURCE: [redacted] APEX Status Report, ADC, 30 June 1964 [HRF].

CHART 8

1966 FIGHTER INTERCEPTOR PROGRAM

(As Programmed 15 March 1962)

Sqdn	Base	Aircraft	Number	Dispersal Base
95	Andrews	F-106A	18	Patuxent River NAS, Md.
319	Bunker Hill	F-106A	18	Hulman Field, Ind.
456	Castle	F-106A	18	Fresno, Calif.
444	Charleston	F-101B	18	Shaw AFB, S.C.
15	Davis-Monthan	F-101B	18	Williams AFB, Ariz.
98	Dover	F-101B	18	Atlantic City, N.J.
75	Dow	F-101B	18	Bagotville, Que.
11	Duluth	F-106A	18	Winnipeg, Man.
329	George	F-106A	18	San Clemente, Calif.
13	Glasgow	F-101B	18	Saskatoon, Sask.
59	Goose	F-102A	33	Gander, Nfld.
18	Grand Forks	F-101B	18	Gimli, Sask.
49	Griffiss	F-101B	18	Trenton, Ont.
83	Hamilton	F-101B	12	Siskiyou, Calif.
84	Hamilton	F-101B	12	Lemoore, Calif.
62	K.I. Sawyer	F-101B	18	Volk Field, Wisc.
438	Kincheloe	F-106A	18	Val D'Or, Que.
322	Kingsley	F-101B	18	None
48	Langley	F-106A	18	Cherry Point, N.C.
87	Lockbourne	F-101B	18	Clinton County AFB, Ohio
27	Loring	F-106A	18	Chatham, N.B.
29	Malmstrom	F-101B	18	Edmonton, Alta.

CHART 8 (Continued)

Sqdn	Base	Aircraft	Number	Dispersal Base
318	McChord	F-106A	18	Comox, B.C.
539	McGuire	F-106A	18	Olmsted AFB, Pa.
5	Minot	F-106A	18	Portage la Prairie, Man.
60	Otis	F-101B	18	Brunswick, Me.
437	Oxnard	F-101B	18	San Nicholas, Calif.
64	Paine	F-102A	26	Comox, B.C.
460	Portland	F-102A	26	Walla Walla, Wash.
326	Richards-Gebaur	F-102A	20	Grand Island, Neb.
71	Selfridge	F-106A	12	Phelps-Collins Fld, Mich.
94	Selfridge	F-106A	18	Phelps-Collins Fld, Mich.
482	Seymour Johnson	F-102A	26	Burlington, Vt.
498	Spokane	F-106A	18	Calgary, Alta.
2	Suffolk	F-101B	18	Greenwood, Ont.
82	Travis	F-102A	26	Chico, Calif.
325	Truax	F-102A	20	Des Moines, Ia.
331	Webb	F-102A	20	Laughlin AFB, Tex.
76	Westover	F-102A	26	Summerside, Que.
445	Wurtsmith	F-101B	18	Volk Field, Wisc.
57	Keflavik	F-89D	12	None

As of 30 June 1966:

F-101B (18)	15
F-106A (18)	13
F-102A (26)	5
F-102A (20)	3
F-101B (12)	2
F-106A (12)	1
F-102A (33)	1
F-89D (12)	1
	41 squadrons

SOURCE: ADCM 27-2, Volume II, 15 March 1962.

CHART 9

1967 FIGHTER INTERCEPTOR PROGRAM

(As Programmed 24 January 1963)

Sqdn	Base	Aircraft	Number	Dispersal Base
319	Bunker Hill	F-106A	12	Hulman Field, Ind.
456	Castle	F-106A	18	Edwards AFB, Calif.
444	Charleston	F-101B	18	Clinton County AFB, Ohio
15	Davis-Monthan	F-101B	12	Williams AFB, Ariz.
95	Dover	F-106A	18	Atlantic City, N.J.
75	Dow	F-101B	18	Bagotville, Que.
11	Duluth	F-106A	24	Volk Field, Wisc.
329	George	F-106A	18	San Clemente, Calif.
13	Glasgow	F-101B	18	Saskatoon, Sask.
59	Goose	F-102A	26	Gander, Nfld.
18	Grand Forks	F-101B	18	Saskatoon, Sask.
49	Griffiss	F-101B	18	Val D'Or, Que.
84	Hamilton	F-101B	24	Siskiyou, Calif.
57	Keflavik	F-102A	12	None
62	K.I. Sawyer	F-101B	18	Phelps-Collins Fld, Mich.
438	Kincheloe	F-106A	18	Volk Field, Wisc.
322	Kingsley	F-101B	24	Siskiyou, Calif.
48	Langley	F-106A	18	Byrd Field, Va.
87	Lockbourne	F-101B	18	Clinton County AFB, Ohio
27	Loring	F-106A	18	Chatham, N.B.
29	Malmstrom	F-101B	18	Logan Field, Mont.
318	McChord	F-106A	18	Calgary, Alta.
498	McChord	F-106A	18	Calgary, Alta.

CHART 9 (Continued)

Sqdn	Base	Aircraft	Number	Dispersal Base
539	McGuire	F-106A	18	Olmsted AFB, Pa.
5	Minot	F-106A	18	Portage la Prairie, Man.
60	Otis	F-101B	18	Shearwater, N.S.
437	Oxnard	F-101B	24	San Nicholas, Calif.
64	Paine	F-102A	26	Comox, B.C.
460	Portland	F-102A	26	Walla Walla, Wash.
326	Richards-Gebaur	F-102A	26	Grand Island, Neb.
71	Selfridge	F-106A	12	Niagara Falls, N.Y.
94	Selfridge	F-106A	12	Niagara Falls, N.Y.
482	Seymour Johnson	F-102A	26	New Hanover, N.C.
2	Suffolk	F-101B	18	Grenier Field, N.H.
98	Suffolk	F-101B	18	Grenier Field, N.H.
82	Travis	F-102A	26	Fresno, Calif.
325	Truax	F-102A	26	Capital Field, Ill.
331	Webb	F-102A	20	Reese AFB, Tex.
445	Wurtsmith	F-101B	18	Phelps-Collins Fld, Mich.

As of 30 June 1967:

F-101B	(18)	12
F-106A	(18)	10
F-102A	(26)	7
F-106A	(12)	3
F-101B	(24)	3
F-101B	(12)	1
F-106A	(24)	1
F-102A	(12)	1
F-102A	(20)	1
		39 squadrons

SOURCE: ADCM 27-2, Volume II, 15 March 1962, as amended by Change H, 24 January 1963.

CHART 10

1968 FIGHTER INTERCEPTOR PROGRAM

(As Programmed 1 July 1963)

Sqdn	Base	Aircraft	Number	Dispersal Base
456	Castle	F-106A	18	Siskiyou, Calif.
444	Charleston	F-101B	18	New Hanover, N.C.
15	Davis-Monthan	F-101B	18	Williams AFB, Ariz.
95	Dover	F-106A	18	Atlantic City, N.J.
75	Dow	F-101B	18	Bagotville, Que.
11	Duluth	F-106A	18	Volk Field, Wisc.
329	George	F-106A	18	Edwards AFB, Calif.
13	Glasgow	F-101B	18	Cold Lake, Alta.
59	Goose	F-102A	26	None
18	Grand Forks	F-101B	18	Portage la Prairie, Man.
49	Griffiss	F-101B	18	Val D'Or, Que.
84	Hamilton	F-101B	18	Siskiyou, Calif.
319	Homestead	F-104A	24	None
62	K.I. Sawyer	F-101B	18	Phelps-Collins Fld, Mich
438	Kincheloe	F-106A	18	Volk Field, Wisc.
322	Kingsley	F-101B	18	Comox, B.C.
48	Langley	F-106A	18	Byrd Field, Va.
87	Lockbourne	F-101B	18	Clinton County AFB, Ohio
27	Loring	F-106A	18	Chatham, N.B.
29	Malmstrom	F-101B	18	Cold Lake, Alta.
318	McChord	F-106A	12	Namao, Alta.
498	McChord	F-106A	18	Namao, Alta.
539	McGuire	F-106A	18	Olmsted AFB, Pa.
5	Minot	F-106A	18	Billings, Mont.

CHART 10 (Continued)

Sqdn	Base	Aircraft	Number	Dispersal Base
60	Otis	F-101B	18	Shearwater, N.S.
437	Oxnard	F-101B	24	None
64	Paine	F-102A	26	Walla Walla, Wash.
460	Portland	F-102A	26	Walla Walla, Wash.
326	Richard-Gebaur	F-102A	26	Grand Island, Neb.
71	Selfridge	F-106A	12	Niagara Falls, N.Y.
94	Selfridge	F-106A	12	Niagara Falls, N.Y.
482	Seymour Johnson	F-102A	26	McEntire AGB, S.C.
2	Suffolk	F-101B	18	Grenier Field, N.H.
98	Suffolk	F-101B	18	Grenier Field, N.H.
82	Travis	F-102A	26	Fresno, Calif.
325	Truax	F-102A	26	Hulman Field, Ind.
445	Wurtsmith	F-101B	18	Phelps-Collins Fld, Mich.

As of 30 June 1968:

F-101B	(18)	15
F-106A	(18)	10
F-102A	(26)	7
F-106A	(12)	3
F-101B	(24)	1
F-104A	(24)	1
		37 squadrons

SOURCE: ADCM 27-2, Volume II, 15 April 1963 and Change D, 1 July 1963.

CHART 11

1969 FIGHTER INTERCEPTOR PROGRAM

(As Programmed 3 July 1964)

Sqdn	Base	Aircraft	Number	Dispersal Base
456	Castle	F-106A	18	Fresno, Calif.
444	Charleston	F-101B	18	New Hanover, N.C.
16	Davis-Monthan	F-102A	26	Williams AFB, Ariz.
95	Dover	F-106A	18	Atlantic City, N.J.
75	Dow	F-101A	18	Bagotville, Que.
11	Duluth	F-106A	18	Volk Field, Wisc.
329	George	F-106A	18	Edwards AFB, Calif.
13	Glasgow	F-106A	18	Cold Lake, Alta.
59	Goose	F-102A	26	Ernest Harmon AB, Nfld.
18	Grand Forks	F-101B	18	Portage la Prairie, Man.
49	Griffiss	F-101B	18	Val D'Or, Que.
84	Hamilton	F-101B	18	Siskiyou, Calif.
319	Homestead	F-104A	24	Patrick AFB, Fla.
62	K.I. Sawyer	F-101B	18	Phelps-Collins Fld, Mich
438	Kincheloe	F-106A	18	Volk Field, Wisc.
322	Kingsley	F-101B	18	Comox, B.C.
48	Langley	F-106A	18	Byrd Field, Va.
87	Lockbourne	F-101B	18	Clinton County AFB, Ohio
27	Loring	F-106A	18	Chatham, N.B.
29	Malmstrom	F-101B	18	Cold Lake, Alta.
318	McChord	F-106A	12	Namao, Alta.
498	McChord	F-106A	12	Namao, Alta.
539	McGuire	F-106A	18	Olmsted AFB, Pa.

CHART 11 (Continued)

Sqdn	Base	Aircraft	Number	Dispersal Base
5	Minot	F-106A	18	Logan Field, Mont.
60	Otis	F-101B	18	Shearwater, N.S.
437	Oxnard	F-101B	18	El Centro, Calif.
64	Paine	F-102A	26	Walla Walla, Wash.
469	Portland	F-102A	26	Walla Walla, Wash.
326	Richards-Gebaur	F-102A	26	Grand Island, Nebr.
71	Selfridge	F-106A	12	Niagara Falls, N.Y.
94	Selfridge	F-106A	12	Niagara Falls, N.Y.
482	Seymour Johnson	F-102A	26	Key West NAS, Fla.
2	Suffolk	F-101B	18	Grenier Field, N.H.
98	Suffolk	F-101B	18	Grenier Field, N.H.
82	Travis	F-102A	26	Siskiyou, Calif.
325	Truax	F-102A	26	Hulman Field, Ind.
445	Wurtsmith	F-101B	18	Phelps-Collins, Mich.

As of 30 June 1969:

F-101B	(18)	14
F-106A	(18)	10
F-102A	(26)	8
F-106A	(12)	4
F-104A	(24)	1
		37 squadrons

212

SOURCE: ADC Program Document 64-69, 15 April 1964 and Change C, 3 July 1964.

CHART 12

BASE DEPLOYMENT OF THE FIGHTER-INTERCEPTOR FORCE 1946-1964



[redacted]

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CHART 12 (Con't)

BASE DEPLOYMENT OF THE FIGHTER-INTERCEPTOR FORCE 1946-1964

	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64
ANDREWS AFB, MD.						●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●		
DOVER AFB, DEL.						●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
STEWART AFB, N.Y.							●	●	●	●	●	●	●						
YOUNGSTOWN AFB, OHIO							●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●					
PAINE FLD., WASH.							●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
OXNARD AFB, CALIF.							●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
SIOUX CITY APRT., IOWA							●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●					
McGHEE TYSON FLD., TENN.							●	●	●	●	●	●							
KINCHELOE AFB, MICH.								●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
MALMSTROM AFB, MONT.								●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
RICHARDS-GEBAUR AFB, MO.								●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
DAVIS-MONTHAN AFB, ARIZ.								●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
SPOKANE I.A.P., WASH.								●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●		
CHARLESTON AFB, S.C.									●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
TRAVIS AFB, CALIF.									●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
CASTLE AFB, CALIF.										●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
BUNKER HILL AFB, IND.										●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●		
HANSCOM FLD, MASS.										●	●	●	●	●					
K.I. SAWYER AFB, MICH.											●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
SEYMOUR JOHNSON AFB, N.C.											●	●	●	●		●	●	●	●
KINGSLEY FLD., ORE.											●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
McCOY AFB, FLA.												●	●	●	●				
GOOSE A.B., NFLD.												●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
THULE A.B. GREENLAND												●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
HARMON A.B. NFLD.												●	●	●					
WEBB AFB, TEXAS													●	●	●	●	●	●	●
GLASGOW AFB, MONT.														●	●	●	●	●	●
LORING AFB, ME.														●	●	●	●	●	●
WALKER AFB, N.M.														●					
ENGLAND AFB, LA.														●					
MINOT AFB, N.D.															●	●	●	●	●
GRAND FORKS AFB, N.D.															●	●	●	●	●
KEFLAVIK N.A.S. ICELAND																	●	●	●
HOMESTEAD AFB, FLA.																	●	●	●

[redacted]

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[redacted]

CHART 13

TOTAL TACTICAL AIRCRAFT POSSESSED BY ADC
1950–1964



NO.	365	813	690	625	700	865	1180	1275	1155	1410	1490	1490	1260	1490	1450	1350	1375	1265	1200	870	800	775	810	765	750	710	700	690

215

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CHART 14

ADC JET ALL-WEATHER INTERCEPTORS POSSESSED (CENTURY SERIES)

1955–1964



	12/55	6/56	12/56	6/57	12/57	6/58	12/58	6/59	12/59	6/60	12/60	6/61	12/61	6/62	12/62	6/63	12/63	6/64
F-101-B	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	75	190	305	365	380	330	285	285	260	245	250
F-102	0	5	95	300	455	515	625	610	475	330	210	195	225	230	225	175	195	191
F-104	0	0	0	0	0	50	100	85	90	20	0	0	0	0	0	95	95	36
F-106	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	20	95	180	215	210	245	250	235	225	215	211

CHART 15

ADC JET ALL-WEATHER INTERCEPTORS POSSESSED (FIRST GENERATION) 1950-1961



	12/50	6/51	12/51	6/52	12/52	6/53	12/53	6/54	12/54	6/55	12/55	6/56	12/56	6/57	12/57	6/58	12/58	6/59	12/59	6/60	12/60	6/61
F-86 D/L	0	0	0	0	0	145	640	795	725	1026	1042	1014	765	735	615	420	325	185	135	0	0	0
F-89 D/H/J	0	15	21	49	64	29	65	115	125	185	250	295	230	335	355	335	315	240	205	80	7	0
F-94	60	80	140	115	90	145	235	280	195	185	200	170	160	112	49	17	15	0	0	0	0	0

CHART 16

ADC DAY FIGHTERS (JET) AND CONVENTIONAL INTERCEPTORS POSSESSED 1950 – 1955



	12/50	6/51	12/51	6/52	12/52	6/53	12/53	6/54	12/54	6/55
F-47	0	94	70	70	45	45	0	0	0	0
F-51	0	200	195	155	135	160	0	0	0	0
F-80	0	40	35	20	25	20	0	0	0	0
F-84	45	85	40	25	15	100	0	0	0	0
F-86	235	225	175	275	275	185	140	70	55	0